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ABSTRACT. The aim of the paper is twofold: to verify a full policy failure of public support on private 
R&D effort, when in presence of a potential plurality of public incentives; to compare the most recent 
econometric methods used for the analysis of the input additionality.   
Compared to previous studies our work wants to trace out an advance in two directions: adding more 
robustness by comparing results from various econometric techniques and providing an analysis of the 
R&D policy effect behind the average results. A by-product of the paper is a taxonomy of the 
econometric methods used in the literature, according to the structure of the models, the type of dataset 
and the available policy information.  
We exploit the third wave of the Community Innovation Survey for Italy (1998-2000) with a sample 
size of 1,221 supported and 1,319 non-supported firms. Given the used type of data, the article presents 
two main limits: first, we do not know the level of the subsidy, so that we can control only for the 
presence of a total crowding-out; second, we can check only the short-run effect of the supporting 
policy, while an increase in the private R&D effort could be more likely in the medium term.  
Our results suggest that: 1. the main factors influencing the probability to participate to the incentive 
policy are R&D experience, human skills, liquidity constraints, but also foreign capital ownership; 2. on 
average, the total substitution of private funding by the public one is excluded for Italy as a whole, 
although some cases of total crowding-out are found: low knowledge intensive services, very small 
firms (10-19 employees) and the auto-vehicle industry. We get, on average, 885 additional thousand 
Euros of R&D expenditure per firm with a ratio equal to 4.62: it means that if a generic control unit 
does 1 thousand Euros of R&D expenditure a matched treated does 4.62 thousand Euros. The 
additionality for the R&D intensity is about 0.014 with a ratio of about 2.67. 
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1. THE IMPACT EVALUATION OF R&D 
FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES: PROBLEMATIC 
ISSUES AND OUR AIM 
he evaluation of the effect of a public 
subsidy to private R&D projects is a 
difficult task. The “input additionality” 
related to public incentive for industrial R&D is 
the political core issue. Governments are first of 
all interested in assessing how much firms have 
increased private funded R/D as an effect of 
some public funded instrument. This evaluation 
needs information on the cost of each specific 
policy instrument as well as it needs to isolate 
one instrument from the others. Generally firms 
benefit of more than one public incentive and 
therefore for a policy maker a frequent trade-off 
can be envisaged between the availability of 
information/data on a specific instrument 
(assuming the strong hypothesis that it is the 
only incentive the firm benefit of), and less 
focused information/data on an aggregated pool 
of instruments (such as in our case), which 
doesn’t inform on which instrument works and 
what is the relation among them. We are aware 
of these problems, that remind also to a critical 
question for policy makers: planning the 
evaluation ahead of time, when a policy measure 
is designed, and collect the right data.  
Moreover policy makers are confronted with 
other problems related to the selection of 
projects: for a public agency it is difficult to 
identify ex-ante when the project is a “marginal” 
one or when it is an “inframarginal” one, i.e., a 
project that would be privately profitable even 
in absence of a public subsidy.  
The ex-post controls by public agency rarely 
includes demonstrating the additional character 
of the incentive, that is, the marginal effect2; 
they are mainly focused on the measurement of 
project outputs3 or often they only rely on 
                                                                    
2 See Jaffe (1998) cited in Wallsten (2000, p. 85): 
“government technological programs have never been 
designed to include comprehensive economic 
evaluation, making it almost impossible to identify 
marginal effects”.  
3 In Italy examples of industrial policy evaluation 
concern mostly incentives to capital formation (made on 
the behalf of the Ministry of Economic Development) 
and very few examples concern R/D incentives. The 
independent organization of research evaluation (CIVR) 
had within its institutional tasks the evaluation of some 
qualitative surveys asking firms for whether 
they would have developed the R&D project 
without the public support.  
The “additionality” question has a specific 
rationale: looking at how much additional 
private resources for R&D are mobilised by the 
incentive, where the relation to be explored is 
between public and private investment in R&D, 
rather than between public incentive and final 
private performance. The question has been 
largely explored by economic scholars, trying to 
answer to the questions: how do firms react to 
the public subsidies? Do public subsidies 
become a substitute of private R&D investment 
and in what cases? The effect of public funding 
on R&D private funding is an obligatory 
passage for identifying its impact on the firm 
final performance.  
As Wallsten (2000, p. 84) wrote: “the 
problem of the government is to finance the best 
projects among those that cannot receive 
adequate funds from other sources”. The 
purpose of government of course is larger than 
the firm one’s: it is that of increasing the social 
return from private R&D activity and this asks 
for including an assessment of the “spillover 
effects” (i.e., social indirect effects), which are 
larger when the R&D project has a more generic 
or pre-competitive character. 
In this paper we look only at the additionality 
effect at firm level, starting from the 
consideration that the “marginal” effect 
(additional R&D) is a basic condition also for 
increasing knowledge spillovers and social 
benefits.  
As it has been found out in the literature, 
according to the type of instrument the impact 
should be more or less the following: 
                                                                                                 
research programmes (FIRB), but the established criteria 
of evaluation have not been still operationalised. In the 
past a private body (IMI) in charge of the management 
of the main public fund for industrial applied research 
(FAR) developed an ex-post evaluation based on 
qualitative questionnaire; now the reform of the applied 
research incentive FAR (L 297/99), managed by MUR, 
includes an ex-post evaluation in two steps (at the end of 
the project and two years later). This is a compelling 
task for firms, which cannot present a new demand of 
fund, if they do not follow this rule. But this ex-post 
evaluation too, is of a qualitative type, based on 
questionnaire and focused on an analysis of R/D project 
output (firm increase of sales and productivity). 
T 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 9 /2008 
 
 8 
− R&D contracts, which are less developed in 
Europe, include a double public action, on the 
R&D project cost side and on the firm’s 
return from the R&D project, given that they 
impact also on the firm’s sales (the gover-
nment is the final buyer of the R&D results, 
new processes or new products)4; 
− R&D mission oriented programs, based on a 
bid programs, which became more important 
since 80’s in Europe5, impact on the R&D 
cost side; they do not include a government 
role as “final consumer”, but they are often 
collaborative projects, acting on R&D “ap-
propriability” aspects (internalization of 
knowledge externalities within different agre-
ement design, as emphasized in the literature 
on R&D joint ventures); therefore, they can 
have an effect on sales and R&D return that 
needs to be specifically explored; 
− R&D grants for bottom-up projects are the 
oldest and most diffused instruments of pub-
lic R&D project funding in Europe; this type 
of incentive impacts mainly on the R&D cost 
side and does not influence directly the mar-
ginal return schedule in the short-run.  
Studies on the financial subsidy impact are 
characterised by the difficulty of distinguishing 
within the combined effect of different 
instruments, either if they analyse a specific 
instrument6 or a set of them. The latter is also 
our case: we can know only the “gross effect” of 
a combination of public incentives supporting 
private R&D, since we exploit a data source (the 
third Italian Community Innovation Survey) that 
doesn’t allow to distinguish among them. Data 
include three governance levels of R&D subsidy 
allocation (national, regional and EU) and for 
each level a combination of incentives7. For 
example, at national level the mix of 
instruments, which our 1998-2000 data refer to, 
                                                                    
4 See David, Hall and Toole (2000). 
5 See Potì and Reale (2007). 
6 Also when studying the subsidy effect of a single 
program it is necessary to know if firms benefit of other 
R/D policy instruments. 
7 CIS data offer an aggregated but exhaustive 
information on R/D incentives; it allows to disentangle 
incentives at the most by the three governance levels, 
although it could be possible to control also for all 
possible combinations of them without identifying 
specific incentives “within” each governance level. 
includes mainly national grants for Applied 
research bottom-up projects, R&D fiscal 
incentives for SMEs, national funds for R&D 
projects on a bid procedure for investments in 
the Ob. 1 regions (mainly Southern regions) and 
pre-competitive development projects. The 
weight of this mix of national instruments in 
2002 was the following (2002 Main Government 
R&D appropriation in million Euros)8: 
− FAR Bottom-up projects (for applied re-
search): 573.9 (of which 64.3% to large 
firms); 
− FIT Bottom up projects (for pre-competitive 
development activities): 1,630.7 (of which 
1,125.8 as refundable loans); 
− R&D tax credit: 86.35 (to SMEs); 
− PON R&D Programmes: 110 (specifically for 
investment in the Ob. 1 regions). 
The CIS mix of instruments includes 
European projects: they are co-funded, but as 
Klette and Møen (1998, p. 6) have observed, 
matching grants do not exclude a neutral or 
partial crowding-out effect.  
The different amount of the public 
contribution to the R&D cost can have a 
different impact, but some source of data 
doesn’t allow to know the “level” of public 
funding (see analysis using CIS data and see 
also Busom, 2000); in our work data include 
only binary information on the presence/absence 
of at least one public fund at firm level during a 
three year period (1998-2000). 
Public agencies use “systematic selection 
criteria” based on project quality and feasibility 
plus some social aims, such as: encouraging 
SMEs, which have problem of limited internal 
funds, R&D fixed costs and low access to 
external fund and capital risk, or promoting 
sectors with larger spillover effect. But they can 
also be oriented to a “picking-the-winners” 
strategy: financing marginal projects implies 
risks of failure and public agencies could prefer 
projects with returns less complex to estimate.  
Among the reasons causing the failure of 
public R&D incentive policy, the following ones 
have been most mentioned in the literature: 
                                                                    
8 See Centro Studi Confindustria (2004). 
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− firm opportunistic behaviour (see Wallsten 
2000, p. 85; Antonelli, 1989, p. 76): firms 
apply for infra-marginal projects, since public 
funding is less costly then other “external” 
sources fund and public agency does not 
check for this aspect, while firms wish to im-
prove their chance of getting an aid;  
− time substitution: firms receiving a subsidy 
can wish to anticipate projects planned for the 
future (Bronzini and De Blasio, 2006, p. 3)9;  
− institutional characters of funding procedure: 
if the government transfer of funds to the 
public instruments is characterised by impor-
tant ups and downs, firms cannot include 
public subsidy among the effective stimulus 
of an investment; their R&D decision are of-
ten independent from subsidy expectation, 
with an effect of crowding-out when public 
fund is available (Cannari, D’Aurizio and De 
Blasio, 2007)10; 
− the third component deals with the effect of a 
cost increase in the R&D factor supply (i.e. 
salaries of researchers and engineers) when 
inputs’ demand increases, given an higher 
R&D activity. This general equilibrium effect 
is more relevant for large R&D contracts and 
when the incentive affects a large number of 
firms; 
− differences in the effect of public subsidy can 
be due also to differences in the structure of 
firm’s R&D capital cost and R&D return. In 
particular, as to capital cost, firms have to an-
ticipate R&D project funding, after getting a 
public commitment, and they are refunded on 
their expenditures; firms could not have e-
nough liquidity (especially SMEs) to follow 
this path and the announcement of getting a 
public subsidy cannot significantly affect e-
                                                                    
9 The authors investigated the behaviour of firms 
subsidized by fixed capital grants through a panel 
analysis and found out that firms tend to anticipate 
future planned investments, reducing their investment in 
the years following the subsidised program. This inter-
temporal substitution has been studied in the literature 
mainly for capital investment and purchasing of durable 
goods.  
10 The authors have conducted a survey where 
recipient firms evaluated the role of the public incentives 
on fixed capital investment: 74% would have carried out 
exactly the same amount of investment and 17% would 
simply have postponed it (time substitution effect).  
quity holders’ or banks’ conditions in suppor-
ting R&D investments (especially in absence 
of a developed venture capital market); this is 
the case of an inelastic R&D capital marginal 
cost function;  
− another case can be that of a perfectly inelas-
tic cost functions, where firms are “asset con-
strained”, given their inability to access to ex-
ternal sources of funds (debt or equity fi-
nance) or given the high cost of downstream 
activities, complementary to R&D11. 
Finally, another relevant element to be taken 
into consideration is that one of the output of an 
additional R&D activity is the creation of new 
capabilities, whose effect can be seen only in a 
medium-long term; therefore, even if in the 
short-run the effect of a public subsidy could be 
neutral or a (partial) crowding-out, in the long-
run the effect can be relevant. Klette e Møen 
(1998) showed for R&D programs in Norway 
that public subsidies can produce no effects in 
the short-run, but positive effects in the long-run 
even after an interruption of the instrument; the 
today funded research activity, if realised and 
even if with a partial crowding-out (since the 
project was included in the firms’ portfolio) can 
positively impact on firm’s future R&D, by a 
“learning” effect that increases R&D 
productivity. Antonelli (1989) advanced the 
hypothesis for Italy that a short-run substitution 
effect of the main R&D financial incentives12, 
due to the divergent characters between the 
subsidy (erratic) and the R&D activity (auto 
regressive and rigid) was then followed by a 
increase (even if low) of the R&D privately 
funded investment in the medium term. Cross-
section analyses, of course, have the limit to be 
unable to look at effects distributed along time.  
As it will be clearer later, given our data 
constraints, the objective of our analysis is quite 
limited compared to the complexity of the 
subject; nevertheless it includes: 
− an empirical path for testing the presence of a 
crowding-out effect on private R&D expendi-
ture at firm level in the short-run; we share 
                                                                    
11 See Stead (1976, p. 2-9), cited in Antonelli (1989, 
p. 54). 
12 Firms followed their programmes at short term and 
only at medium term new R/D investments were visible.  
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with other applications in the literature the 
limits of a “binary policy variable”, but we 
add more robustness to our analysis by che-
cking and comparing results through the use 
of various econometric techniques; 
− an analysis of the R&D policy effect by di-
saggregated firm size, sector and geographi-
cal area, since differences in the funding gap 
and in technological opportunities impact on 
R&D investment behaviour. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 
presents a concise overview of the literature 
focusing on: the comparison of various 
evaluation methods, the treatment of the 
endogeneity problem and works sharing some 
similarities with our application; section 3 
provides an exposition of the econometric 
methodology used in our paper (see also 
appendix A for more formal details); section 4 
presents the dataset, the variables used, and 
some descriptive statistics for our sample; 
section 5 shows and comments the econometric 
results for all Italian firms and for various 
subgroups of them; section 6 concludes the 
paper by summarizing results, discussing the 
limits of our application and suggesting some 
potential future improvements. 
Table 1 shows some representative studies we 
met in the literature according to this 
classification. 
 
 
TABLE 1. R&D policy evaluation studies according to the type of specification,  
dataset and policy variable  
TYPE OF MODEL TYPE OF DATASET 
TYPE OF 
POLICY 
VARIABLE METHOD 
Structural Reduced-form 
Cross-
section Longitudinal Binary Level 
REPRESENTATIVE 
STUDIES 
CF-OLS  X X     X Lichtenberg (1987) 
MATCHING  X X  X  Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) 
SELECTION X  X  X  Busom (2000) 
DID  X  X X  Lach (2000) 
IV X  X   X Wallsten (2000) 
 
Note:  CF-OLS: OLS estimation based on a control function;  
 MATCHING: matching models;  
 SELECTION: Heckman selection model;  
 DID: difference-in differences;  
 IV: instrumental variables (2SLS or 3SLS) estimation. 
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2. A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE 
The literature on the issue is very large and the 
main problem is how to organise a review; given 
that some excellent reviews (at macro and micro 
level) have already been realized (David, Hall 
and Toole, 2000; Busom, 2000; Klette, Møen 
and Griliches, 2000), our contribution will be 
addressed to three main aspects: 
1. differences and similarities among different 
approaches;  
2. the way in which the endogeneity of the pol-
icy variable has been treated; 
3. a brief look at those studies we find the 
most similar to our application. 
2.1 Differences and similarities among 
approaches 
To begin with, it seems useful to classify R&D 
policy evaluation studies according to three 
analytical dimensions: 
1. type of specification: models adopting a 
structural-analytical approach, where the 
outcome equation and the selection-into-
program equation are separately modelled in 
a system of simultaneous equations, and 
non-structural models where only the out-
come equation (the so-called “reduced 
form”) is estimated, once controlling for 
some specific covariates13;  
2. type of data used: models based on a cross-
section dataset and models exploiting a lon-
gitudinal one (allowing also for dynamic 
and long-run analysis); 
3. type of policy variable: models using a bi-
nary policy variable (generally in the form 
of “subsidized” versus “non-subsidized” 
units), and models using the policy variable 
                                                                    
13 As it will be clearer later, this distinction between 
structural and non-structural (or reduced-form) models 
couples with that between model taking into account 
endogeneity due to both “selection on observables” and 
“selection on un-observables” (the structural models), 
and those dealing with endogeneity due only to 
“selection on observables” (the non-structural or 
reduced-form models).  
in levels (i.e., in a continuous form).  
The grey area in the table identifies the 
methods we compare in our application even if, 
as it will be made clear in the next section, some 
hypotheses to reach comparability have to be 
added. 
The literature studying the “additionality” 
effect at micro level using a continuous policy 
variable (such as Lichtenberg 1987; 1988) 
generally looks at the elasticity effect of private 
R&D expenditure to the variation in the subsidy 
level. When looking at the effect of a public 
financial subsidy on the private behaviour in 
R&D we can distinguish among the following 
four cases: 
− neutrality effect: when the private R&D ex-
penditure, compared to what firm would have 
done in absence of the grant, increases only 
of the grant amount; 
− partial crowding-out: when the private R&D 
expenditure, compared to what firm would 
have done in absence of the grant, increases 
only of a part of the received public fund; 
− total crowding-out: when the private R&D, 
compared to what firm would have done in 
absence of the grant, remains the same; 
− additionality: when the private R&D expendi-
ture, compared to what firm would have done 
in absence of the grant, increases more than 
the grant amount. This can be the case of a 
firm that would not have made any R&D pro-
ject in absence of the public grant or of a firm 
which would have not done the incremental 
project or would have done a more modest 
R&D project. 
Analytical models explaining the rationale of 
these different (potential) subsidy effects refer to 
a firm profit maximising behaviour in the choice 
of R&D investment level, given the cost of 
R&D factors in a perfectly competitive market 
(Klette and Møen, 1998); or, if a marginal cost 
of R&D capital “which reflect the opportunity 
cost of investment funds at different level of 
R&D investment” is included, to a profit 
maximising firm which would choose the R&D 
investment level where R&D capital marginal 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 9 /2008 
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cost and R&D marginal return are equalized14 
(David, Hall and Toole, 2000, p. 504).  
The background of analytical models refers to 
a “different-from-externality” problem for 
private R&D investment: the gap between the 
private rate of return and the cost of capital, 
when the investing firm and the investors are 
different entities (see also Hall, 2002)15; the 
opportunity cost of capital is described by an 
upward sloping schedule where, even if the firm 
uses only retained earnings for funding R&D 
investment, at the margin, when R&D 
investments increase, firm has to look for 
external investors for other projects (for instance 
tangible capital acquisition); in fact, financing 
R&D outlay by using capital from sources such 
as equity or debt is more costly. In other words, 
different structures of the R&D capital cost 
schedule and of the pre-grant optimal level of 
R&D investment, can explain different firm 
reactions to a given public subsidy. 
If the hypothesis of a “marginal” demand of 
public fund is retained, the neutrality effect can 
be the case of a firm with an inelastic (vertical) 
R&D capital cost curve (that is, an asset 
constrained firm): in this case the public grant 
shifts the cost curve to the right exactly of the 
grant amount16. 
The (partial) crowding-out can be the case of 
a firm with an upward sloping R&D marginal 
cost curve, where the public grant produces an 
increase in R&D expenditure lower than the 
grant amount substituting for more costly 
external sources; the elasticity of R&D 
expenditure changes along the capital cost 
curve: the more distant the optimal pre-grant 
level of R&D is from investment funded by 
“internally generated funds”, the higher the 
crowding-out effect. 
                                                                    
14 A firm derives its R/D marginal return curve when 
“rationally considers the expected cost and benefit 
streams for each project”, given the technological 
innovation possibility set (David, Hall and Toole, 2000, 
p. 503). 
15 The unitary cost of R/D capital is based on a R/D 
investment fund demand and supply and it increases 
with the level of R/D and the type of source of funds. 
16 A case of asset constrained firm could be that of 
firms with a high ratio between the cost of other internal 
functions (design, engineering, marketing, 
commercialisation) and the cost of the R/D internal 
function (Stead, 1976); in these cases firms are more 
cautious in positively reacting to public subsidies. 
Positive cases, therefore, can be identified 
when at the pre-grant equilibrium a firm’s 
marginal return curve cuts the marginal cost 
curve in the horizontal portion (where internal 
fund are available, at a constant cost of capital), 
or in a portion of the cost sloping curve where 
elasticity to fund supply is still high. David, Hall 
and Toole (2000, p. 507) give this explication: 
in this case public grants provide a signal for the 
equity holders and the cost of the firm’s fund is 
shifted down, with a substantial increase of 
R&D investment; thus, the higher the amount of 
the grant, the more important the signal effect17. 
The effect on non public source of fund can also 
be different by country: for instance in the US 
the grant agency review of R&D proposals 
represents a trustable certification and can 
positively impact on the total spending of grant 
recipients18. The shape of the R&D capital cost 
curve depends on the presence of other 
technological policy measures (fiscal treatment 
of R&D expenditure or of capital gain) and on 
the cost of private funding.  
As to the marginal return curve, it can be 
more or less sensible to expected future demand 
signals or to expected other projects success and 
it is function of a set of variables such as market 
conditions, technological opportunities and 
appropriability conditions.  
Few econometric experiments make use of a 
complete analytical approach; generally, very 
simplified structural models have been provided 
such as, for instance, that of Lichtenberg (1987) 
estimating the following reduced form equation 
from a system of equations reminding to the 
David, Hall and Toole (2000) model: 
* ( , )R h= X Z  
where *R  is the private R&D expenditure, 
expressed as function of variables X related to 
R&D cost (such as public subsidy) and variables 
Z related to R&D returns (such as firm sales); 
this “early” model did not deal with the problem 
of endogeneity (see below), assuming the policy 
variable as strictly exogenous.  
                                                                    
17 Indeed, the additional financial input could be used 
for other kind of investments, since R/D projects 
includes a premium to marginal cost for the risk and are 
in competition with other projects within a firm. 
18 See Diamond (1998) and Jaffe (2002) cited in 
Lööf and Heshmati (2005, p. 5). 
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A “later” Lichtenberg model (1988) 
recognised the “endogenous” character of public 
subsidy and used an instrumental variable 
estimation19. Wallsten (2000) followed a path 
similar to Lichtenberg (1988), but he estimated a 
system of three equations, improving estimation 
efficiency by 3SLS. 
Another type of approach always drawn on a 
analytical background is the selection model, as 
proposed by Heckman (1978); this kind of 
model is used to take into account the possibility 
that “unobservable” variables affect both the 
outcome measure and the “being subsidized” 
status; it is composed of two (correlated) 
equations, one for the outcome and the other for 
the selection equation. Busom (2000) provides a 
compelling application of this approach; this 
system of equations models can work with a 
cross-section as well as a longitudinal dataset 
and is especially suitable for a binary policy 
variable20. 
Differently from the foregone models, the 
most part of applied works in the field of R&D 
policy evaluation make use of a more empirical 
viewpoint: matching methods and difference-in-
differences approaches are the most commonly 
used; in particular, the matching method is a 
non-parametric estimation procedure (more in 
the next section) which reduces the group of non 
subsidized firms to a sub-sample of units with 
characteristics more homogeneous to the 
subsidized ones. These methods avoid to specify 
structural equations, while they start from a 
reduced form equation, where theory enters only 
the choice of variables aimed at homogenizing 
subsidized and control firms21. 
2.2  The issue of endogeneity 
The endogeneity issue is a central aspect of 
                                                                    
19 Lichtenberg (1988), in particular, instrumented the 
public subsidy variable by the “value of competitive 
contracts potentially awardable” to the firm.  
20 Both binary and in-level structural models take 
into account the presence of “selection on 
unobservables” into the support program.   
21 For the effect of public subsidy on business R&D 
or on innovative performance using matching methods 
see: Almus and Czanitzki (2003), Duguet (2003), Aerts 
and Czanitzki (2004), Kaiser (2004), Lööf and Heshmati 
(2005) and Bérubé and Mohnen (2007).  
R&D policy evaluation: assuming the policy 
variable (subsidy) to be exogenous, in fact, 
could be seriously misleading, since the funding 
choice operated by the government are not 
independent of the level of firm private R&D 
expenditure; both R&D outlay and subsidy are, 
in fact, codetermined and many firms’ 
characteristics are likely to be highly correlated 
with the non-random choice operated by the 
government22; the simple comparison between 
R&D expenditure average values of subsidized 
and non subsidized firms fails to estimate 
consistently the additional effect of the 
incentive; controlling for the probability of 
receiving a grant/subsidy allows to check for 
factors influencing both the firm’s project 
application and the agency selection; 
nevertheless only instrumental variables and 
selection models (i.e., the structural models) can 
deal with both “selection on observables” and 
“un-observables”, while control function and 
matching can only control for “selection on 
observables"; understanding what type of 
selection mechanisms is at work (dependent on 
not dependent on unknown-to-the-observer 
factors) remain in any case a non-testable prior 
on the side of the analyst.  
2.3 Related studies 
The third and last aspect of our short review 
deals with looking at problems and results for 
those empirical works we find closer to our 
application. We first refer to two studies using, 
as we do, the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) as dataset and the matching procedure as 
evaluation method; we then discuss a third 
paper, the work of Busom (2000), applying a 
“selection model”, a method that we also 
include in our application in order to enhance 
robustness.  
Roughly speaking, all these studies answer 
the question: “what would a subsidized firm, 
with given characteristics, have done if it had 
not been subsidized?”; they use a cross-section 
                                                                    
22 On the Government side, a random choice can be 
present in the “automatic procedure” for fiscal R/D 
support in Italy, where the amount of public budget and 
the eligible firms’ order of application are the factors of 
selection.   
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analysis with a binary policy variable; in this 
setting they can control only for the presence of 
a “total crowding-out”. Indeed, without knowing 
the level of the received subsidy, it cannot be 
possible to estimate the presence and degree of 
additionality: this is a limit shared by all works 
using a binary R&D subsidy variable (included 
our application); in this sense, when we find that 
a subsidized firm presents an R&D expenditure 
significantly higher than a non-subsidized one, 
we can only say that “at least some part of the 
subsidy has been used to do research”23. Two 
types of results can be checked in this kind of 
studies: 
− factors affecting the net effect of being incen-
tive beneficiaries (where factors can have dif-
ferent relevance for the two underlying unob-
servable equations representing the firm ex-
pected profitability of applying for R&D sub-
sidy and the public agency value of funding a 
project); 
− the private R&D effort induced by the sub-
sidy, conditional to the fact of being benefici-
aries. 
Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004) used the third 
wave of the CIS (1998-2000) for Flanders to 
study the relation between R&D subsidies and 
R&D activities through a nearest-neighbor 
matching method; they covered manufacturing 
sectors and some service sectors (computer, 
R&D and business related services) on two 
kinds of samples: one including also non 
innovative24 firms in the control group, and the 
other (like we did) only using innovating firms. 
CIS data have been matched with information 
from a database containing annual account data 
of Belgian firms and information on all patent 
applications, used as one of the outcome 
variables. Moreover, patent data are used to 
control for the presence of R&D activity in the 
previous years (R&D experience), by building a 
knowledge capital stock (based just on patents). 
                                                                    
23 We can exclude a total crowding out but we cannot 
say if this part is higher, equal of lower than the subsidy 
amount, so we cannot measure the actual level of 
subsidy additionality on private R&D effort.  
24 The authors sustain that including only innovating 
firms can bring to underestimate the treatment effect, 
since firms can change their status from non innovator to 
innovator due to the receipt of a subsidy.  
Some results are the following: 
− the most important variables driving firm par-
ticipation to the incentives are size, patent 
stock and export activity; authors also under-
line that the public agencies probably follow 
a “picking the winner” strategy; 
− in the full sample the crowding-out effects for 
R&D can be rejected, but this result could be 
influenced by the presence of non-innovators 
in the control group; 
− the result is confirmed also for the innovating 
firms sample: without subsidies firms would 
have exhibited a significantly smaller R&D 
intensity of about 2.2% on average. 
Lööf and Heshmati (2005) use the third 
Community Innovation Survey for Sweden, both 
on manufacturing sector and business services, 
merged with data on firms’ annual accounts, for 
studying the effect of public funding on private 
R&D expenditure. On average 20.8% of firms 
participated in public R&D schemes, all 
included. Many cross sector differences are 
present in terms of percentage of public fund 
beneficiaries. The authors use a matching 
approach with two estimators (the Nearest 
Neighbour and the Kernel estimator). Many 
differences are found between subsidized and 
non subsidized firms: the first group is 
characterised on average by higher R&D 
intensity, larger gross physical investment per 
employees (capital intensive firms), larger 
amount of equity capital, larger indebtedness per 
employees. But the probability of receiving 
public funds decreases with the firms’ size and 
increases for firms showing a lack of an 
appropriate source of finance as an innovation 
hampering factor, while the degree of 
indebtedness has not a relevant impact. The 
target variable is the R&D per employee. 
Results are slightly different when comparing 
samples including or non including small firms. 
In the first case the two estimation methods, the 
Nearest Neighbour approach and the Kernel 
matching, give evidence that the average 
subsidized firm has greater R&D expenditure 
per employee; but when small firms (10-50 
employees) are dropped out of the sample, the 
difference between supported and non supported 
firms is positive, but becomes statistically 
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significant only for the Kernel matching method 
(see Lööf and Heshmati, 2005, p. 16). The 
authors conclude that they can exclude a 
crowding-out effect only for firms with less than 
50 employees.  
Busom (2000) uses a cross section sample of 
154 Spanish firms doing R&D in 1998 and 
partly (45%) receiving public funding by an 
agency of the Spanish Ministry of Industry. 
Firms could apply for national or European 
fund25 and could conduct more than one project. 
Information about subsidy are of a binary type. 
She uses a structural model, a Heckman system 
of two equations of participation in a public 
R&D programme and of R&D private effort, 
conditional to the participation status. Some 
factors have a significant net effect on the 
probability of getting national public funding: 
firm experience (age) and R&D experience 
(number of previous patents), public 
participation in the ownership and being in two 
sectors (chemicals or pharmaceuticals). Factors 
reducing the probability of getting a subsidy are 
large size and the presence of foreign capital. 
Busom uses various measure of effort (R&D 
expenditure and personnel, in level and 
intensity) and introduces a dummy to control 
also for participation in European funded 
programmes. She uses four types of procedures 
(OLS on the whole sample; OLS distinguishing 
between participants and non participants to the 
incentive programme; the Heckman two steps 
procedure; the maximum likelihood for the two 
joint equations). In absence of public funding 
the R&D effort is explained by the firm size or 
sector, while participating to EU funds does not 
bring increased expenditure. Results show that 
public funding induced more R&D effort, but it 
is not possible to measure the presence of 
“partial” crowding-out.  
In sum, some aspects can be underlined:  
− using more than one econometric test is a 
good practice, although it does not always 
                                                                    
25 The author applies the model to the national 
incentive program, but also to the possibility of getting 
two types of fund (national and European). She found 
out that there is not a joint probability of getting the two 
types of incentives and then examines separately the 
probability of participating to the European funding that, 
differently from national programs, is linked to the firm 
size.  
give convergent results; in this last case au-
thors conclude that a crowding-out effect 
cannot be totally excluded. It should be nec-
essary to get more robust results and identify 
crowding-out cases; 
− factors which influence “being an incentive 
beneficiary” change by country: in some 
cases size and “picking the winner” are key 
aspects (Flanders), in other cases R&D ex-
perience and experience (age) emerge as rele-
vant; internal finance constraints, differently 
from indebtedness, is highly related to par-
ticipation. Some factors are probably more 
linked to the firm decision (i.e., the export in-
tensity), while other can depend more on pub-
lic agency’s aim (i.e., foreign owned firms 
doing research in the country); 
− the pooled sample level can give results that 
needs a deeper check. Looking at the out-
come by subgroups of firms can offer a 
clearer answer on the performance of the pub-
lic agents rules and in particular to the ques-
tion on whether incentives help firms to over-
come their R&D weakness (SMEs, low tech 
sectors). 
3. THE ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF 
THE ADDITIONALITY EFFECT: 
“MATCHING” VERSUS “SELECTION 
MODEL” APPROACH  
In this section we provide only a brief non-
technical sketch of the methods used to estimate 
the presence of public subsidy additionality on 
our data; more technical details are presented in 
appendix A.  
The main estimation problem arising in non-
experimental statistical designs is that the 
traditional estimation procedure based on the 
simple comparison between average values of 
treated and untreated individuals (in our case: 
subsidized and non subsidized firms) fails to 
estimate consistently the hypothesis of 
“additionality” of treatment on a certain target 
variable. 
In non-experimental designs, in fact, 
treatment is “non-random”, since firms can (at 
least to some extent) decide their status of 
participation (self-selection), as well as 
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government can select to finance particular 
subjects according to specific objective 
functions (for ex., by adopting the principle of 
“aiding-the-poor” or, on the contrary, of 
“picking-the-winner”). 
In econometric terms it means that the 
treatment variable w (assuming the value 1 for 
treated and 0 for untreated units) and the 
outcome variable y (assuming the value y1 for 
treated and y0 for untreated units) are 
stochastically dependent; in this case we cannot 
trust the usual approach of classical inference. 
To overcome this estimation problem 
econometricians have suggested different 
approaches under specific hypotheses: OLS in a 
control function specification, matching, 
instrumental variables and sample selection 
methods are the most known. All these 
approaches are alternatively suitable according 
to the underlying process generating data, 
sharing in turn differential advantages and 
drawbacks26. 
Implementing an instrumental variables 
approach solves the problem of selection on 
unobservables27. In this case, nevertheless, the 
researcher needs to know a full set of exogenous 
variables (the instruments) correlated with the 
treatment variable w and at the same time 
uncorrelated with the outcome y, in order to 
build a 2SLS estimation of the evaluation 
equation. Generally specking, as in many other 
field of econometrics, finding appropriate 
instruments is not easy and asks also for some 
degree of arbitrariness (especially in a just-
identified setting). The sample selection 
approach (as in the Heckman (1978) two-stage 
selection model) is a powerful method to deal, 
as in the case of the instrumental variables, with 
selection on unobservables, but it requires some 
specific distributional hypotheses than other 
models do not need (see, again, appendix A). 
The control function and the matching 
estimators, on the contrary, ask for less 
                                                                    
26 For a concise review see Heckman (2001). 
27 We have selection on unobservables when 
idiosyncratic characteristics unobservable to the 
researcher are correlated with the treatment status 
variable. Without controlling for these characteristics, 
estimates can be inconsistent since these features can 
behave as potential confounders (see Heckman, Urzua 
and Vytlacil, 2006).  
requirements to be applied than the previous 
methods, but are not suitable to deal with 
important aspects such as the selection on 
unobservables. They are reliable just in the case 
of selection on observables28. In fact, they both 
start from the idea that the treatment status is 
correlated with specific observed characteristics 
of firms that, once controlled for, restore the 
condition of a randomised experiment; this 
hypothesis is known in the literature as 
ignorability of treatment and has been proposed 
for the first time by Rubin (1977). Hence, by 
conditioning on these observable characteristics, 
these methods consistently estimate the total 
average treatment effect (ATE) and average 
treatment effect on treated units (ATET) even in 
case of treatment’s non-observable 
heterogeneity and selection on results29. 
Although their limit, if the researcher has at his 
disposal a wide set of observed variables (as in 
our case) the problem of selection on 
unobservables should be attenuated; for this 
reason the majority of studies in the field of 
microeconometric policy evaluation makes use 
of OLS and matching. 
Matching, nonetheless, seems to be preferable 
to OLS for at least three reasons. First, it is a 
non-parametric estimation procedure, so that it 
does not require to specify a particular 
parametric relation between the dependent 
variable and its regressors as in the case of OLS 
(where an additive/linear form is assumed); 
second, the matching procedure considers only 
treated and non treated units in the common 
support by dropping all the controls whose 
variables’ value is higher or smaller than that of 
the treated. Third and more importantly, 
matching reduces the number of non-treated to a 
sub-sample (the selected controls) with 
characteristics more homogeneous to those of 
treated units. These properties of the matching 
method prevent further biases in the ATE and 
                                                                    
28 We have selection on observables when only 
characteristics observable to the researcher are 
correlated with the treatment status variable so that, 
controlling opportunely for them, treatment effects can 
be estimated consistently.  
29 We have treatment’s non-observable heterogeneity 
when the effect of treatment is different in different 
treated units. We have selection on results when 
treatment’s non-observable heterogeneity is correlated 
with the treatment variable.  
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ATET estimation than simple control function 
based on OLS estimation (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2005, p. 871-878). 
To appreciate the economic and statistical 
meaning of our methodology, we present a very 
concise and non-technical overview of the two 
methods we apply in this work to estimate the 
average treatment effect on treated units: the 
matching procedure (to deal with selection on 
observables), and the sample selection approach 
(to deal with selection on unobservables). 
Different kinds of matching estimators have 
been proposed in the literature. Among them the 
most applied (as in our paper) are those based 
on propensity scores (propensity score 
matching). Defined as the probability for an 
individual to get treated, conditional on a certain 
numbers of observable characteristics, the 
propensity score is an index function 
summarizing in a single number (the score) the 
wide set of observable characteristics affecting 
the probability of becoming treated. It is 
obtained from a probit regression where w, the 
treatment status, is the dependent variable and 
observable characteristics are the regressors. 
The propensity score approach solves the 
dimensionality problem arising when the 
number of covariates is high and exact matching 
is not possible (see, for example, Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002 and Ichino, 2006)30. 
In a cross-section dataset (as in our case) the 
idea behind the matching procedure is to 
estimate the counterfactual E(y0 | w=1), i.e., the 
average outcome of treated firms “if they had 
not been treated”, using non treated units that 
are “similar” to treated ones. This similarity can 
be checked according to several firms 
characteristics such as size, turnover, sector in 
which the firm operates and so on. When for 
each treated unit one (or more than one) similar 
non-treated unit(s) has been selected among all 
potential non treated units a comparable sub-
                                                                    
30 Instead of the propensity score, another class of 
matching estimators uses a specific metric (such as the 
Mahalanobis or the Euclidian one) to measure the 
distance between a treated and an untreated unit. 
Recently, also hybrid approaches have been developed 
using, for example, a Mahalanobis metric whose 
arguments are contemporaneously the covariates and the 
propensity score (see, for example, Lechner, 2001). It is 
not clear, however, which is the efficiency gain of 
hybrid models (see Zaho, 2004). 
sample is produced and it can be proved that the 
ATET is consistently estimated; in other words, 
we estimate E(y0 | w=1) with those non-treated 
firms that are like “twins” of the treated ones 
(see appendix A for formulas). The general 
protocol adopted in this work is implemented 
through the following steps: 
1. we specify a probit regression on a given set 
of covariates (x) estimating the propensity 
scores ˆ ( )p x ; 
2. according to the estimates obtained in the 
previous step, we test the balancing prop-
erty taking the specification satisfying it, 
and reducing observations on treated units 
to those in the common support; 
3. according to the considered matching 
method and for each treated unit, we select 
the potential control(s), that is, those non-
treated units more similar to the treated 
ones; 
4. once obtained the matched comparison 
group, we calculate the estimated ATET us-
ing the appropriate formula. 
Of course, different matching methods re-
quire different formulas for the calculus of the 
ATET. In our work we compare the following 
seven matching procedures: 1. stratification, 2. 
one-to-one nearest neighbour, 3. three-nearest 
neighbours, 4. kernel, 5. radius (with a calliper 
of 0.001), 6. radius (with a calliper of 0.0001), 
7. radius (with a calliper of 0.00001).  
As pointed out above, matching (as well as 
OLS) can produce nevertheless misleading 
estimates of the ATET (as well as the ATE) in 
the case of “selection on un-observables”. If 
some unobservable variables affect 
simultaneously the outcome and the treatment 
status, even by conditioning on the right 
observables, the estimation of the ATET could 
be inconsistent since, by definition, w and y are 
still correlated. To take into account the 
presence of selection on un-observables, we will 
make use of the Heckman-Maddala (Heckman, 
1978 and Maddala, 1983) selection model, 
comparing its results with those coming from 
the matching procedures. 
Very concisely, the model is composed of 
two (correlated) equations: one for the outcome 
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and one for the selection equation, and takes the 
following form: 
*
*
*
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0     0
( ; ) 0
i i i i
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where x and z are covariates and u and v are 
unobservable components (error terms) with 
zero unconditional mean, but supposed to be 
correlated. Under this assumptions 
( ) 0i iE w u⋅ ≠  so that the OLS estimate of the 
outcome equation is inconsistent; it is easy to 
show that inconsistency of OLS on the outcome 
equation (the first one in the previous system) is 
due to an “omitted variable specification error”; 
in appendix A we show technically how to 
restore consistency. 
Observe that the sign of ρ  shows whether 
non-observables in the participation and non-
observables in the outcome are positively or 
negatively correlated and that, to make our 
results by various methods the most comparable, 
we hold matching covariates:x z= =  in this 
way we reduce any arbitrariness in choosing 
different sets of x of z in the two equations. 
4. DATASET AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
The dataset employed in this work comes from 
the third wave of the Italian Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS3) referring to the years 
1998-2000 and collecting 149 variables for 
15,512 manufacturing and service firms. 
Although rich in information, this dataset has 
many limits for the purpose of our study; in 
particular, it does not allow for disentangling 
different kinds of incentive instruments: the CIS 
questionnaire, in fact, is built in such a way that 
fiscal incentives, grants and contracts are all 
pooled; this is a serious drawback, since 
different type of instruments can have very 
different effects on the firm R&D investment 
decision; we can only distinguish among 
national, regional or supranational level of 
Government source of fund. Moreover, the CIS 
does not provide the “level of subsidy”, but only 
a “binary” information on the presence or 
absence of public support.  
The CIS dataset is then merged with firm 
balance sheet variables coming from the Italian 
Chamber of Commerce civil accounts; this 
dataset contains all information on firm 
accounting variables and on the statement of 
assets and liabilities. We take into consideration 
the presence of at least one subsidy received in a 
three year period (from 1998 to 2000), while 
firm R&D expenditure refers to 2000. We define 
a treated (or supported) firm as one answering at 
least one “yes” to the questions regarding R&D 
funding from central and local government and 
from the EU within the period 1998-2000, as 
well as from EU IV° (1994-2008) and V° (1998-
2002) Framework Program31; respectively, it is 
considered as “potential control” a firm 
answering “no” to all those questions. Since 
only innovating firms answer to the CIS funding 
questions, the total sample drop to 5,672 units 
whose number of supported firms is 2,347 
(41%) and that of non-supported ones is 3,325 
(59%). 
Table 2 shows the distribution of public 
subsidies according to the type of financing 
sources32. Firms receiving a “Government” fund 
represent about 61% of our sample; reporting 
this value to the industrial population, by using 
sample weights, there is a decrease of treated 
firms under 50%; firms receiving “local” funds 
are about 44% in our sample, value that doesn’t 
change too much when reported to the entire 
population; firms supported by EU funds are 
about 21%, while firms getting a Framework 
programme funds, finally, are about 12%. It is 
worth to note that receiving or not a certain type 
of funds does not exclude to benefit from one of 
the other funds. 
 
 
                                                                    
31 Questions 9.1a, 9.1b, 9.1c and 9.2 of the CIS3 
questionnaire. 
32 Throughout this work, when we use sample 
weights we do not correct for potential outliers, since 
each unit becomes representative of a part of the whole 
population; when we do not use sample weights, on the 
contrary, we choose to cut the 1% of observations on the 
right-tail of R&D intensity variable.  
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TABLE 2. Distribution of public subsidies according to different sources for financing  
Local funds - un-weighted Government funds - un-weighted 
 Freq. Percent Cum.  Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 683 55.94 55.94 0 470 38.49 38.49 
1 538 44.06 100 1 751 61.51 100 
Total 1221 100  Total 1221 100  
Local funds - weighted Government funds - weighted 
 Freq. Percent Cum.  Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 3027 44.95 44.95 0 3439 51.07 51.07 
1 3707 55.05 100 1 3295 48.93 100 
Total 6734 100  Total 6734 100  
 
EU funds - un-weighted FP funds - un-weighted 
 Freq. Percent Cum.  Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 969 79.36 79.36 0 1072 87.80 87.80 
1 252 20.64 100 1 149 12.20 100 
Total 1221 100  Total 1221 100  
EU funds - weighted FP funds - weighted 
 Freq. Percent Cum.  Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 5522 81.99 81.99 0 6199 92.06 92.06 
1 1212 18.01 100 1 534 7.94 100 
Total 6734 100  Total 6734 100  
Note:  0 = receiving; 
  1 = non- receiving 
 
As to the main variables characterizing firm 
structure as well as the selection mechanism (we 
will use in our probit specification), we 
distinguish between endogenous and exogenous 
variables: 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
R&D expenditure 00: intra-muros R&D in 
thousand Euros in 2000; 
R&D intensity 00: ratio between R&D 
expenditure and firm turnover in 2000; 
R&D per employees 00: ratio between R&D 
expenditure and firm number of employees in 
2000; 
Innovative turnover 00: the share of the 
innovative turnover on total turnover in 2000. 
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES 
EMP 98: this is the number of firm 
employees in 1998. Size is commonly 
recognized as a leading variable in explaining 
firm ability in attracting financing: scale 
economies and a richer set of perceived 
opportunities generally increase with size; 
EMPSKILL 00: this is the share of employees 
with a degree or university diploma on total 
employees in 2000. A higher human capital 
should positively affect the probability of 
attracting financing. More skilled workers 
should enhance the capacity of writing projects, 
promoting fund rising strategies and improving 
knowledge of opportunities; 
EXPINT 98: this is the share of turnover 
stemming from exportations on total firm 
turnover in 1998. It is supposed that more 
internationalised firm operate under a more 
competitive pressure leading to search for a 
diversified strategies portfolio to attract 
innovative capacity such as applications for 
public funds; 
CAPINT 98: this is the capital stock (from 
balance sheet) per employee in 1998. The more 
a firm presents higher capital intensity (lower 
labour intensity), the more it should have an 
incentive to search for a lifelong technological 
upgrading by exploiting, among various 
possibilities, also public subsidies; 
CASHINT 98: this is the cash-flow per 
employee in 1998. A large cash flow identifies a 
necessary condition for augmenting firm self-
financing: the greater its level, the lower the 
need to depend on external resources;  
DEBTINT 98: this is the share of the firm 
total stock of debt on total liabilities in 1998. An 
higher debt represents a financial constraint for 
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the firm that can find increasing difficulties to 
finance its activity by either further indebtedness 
or equity. In this case, firm can turn to attract 
non-market funds such as public subsidies; 
KNOWLEDGE 98: this is the value of 
intellectual property rights (such as patents) and 
capitalized R&D expenditures per employee in 
1998. The idea behind the choice of this variable 
is that past innovative performances matter in 
attracting current subsidies especially when 
government implements a policy aimed at 
awarding previous winners. Nevertheless, 
immaterial assets are not exact measures of the 
firm knowledge stock for at least two reasons: 
first, it does not consider knowledge 
obsolescence, since it is a gross (rather than net) 
measure of immaterial objects (moreover, even 
if we use the net counterpart, we know that 
accountable depreciation differs from economic 
depreciation); second, it is a quite variegate 
ensemble of items (R&D expenditures, patents 
and other intellectual property rights acquired by 
third party or produced in-house) that is 
sometimes subjectively defined33. A more 
correct procedure should be building a capital 
knowledge stock using a perpetual inventory 
method with a prefixed rate of obsolescence 
(either by R&D expenditures or using number of 
patents), but we do not have a sufficiently long 
time-series of these variables to do that. 
Therefore, we use balance sheet data by 
acknowledging their limits; 
FOREIGN: this is a dummy variable tacking 
one if the firm belongs to a foreign group and 
zero otherwise. The nationality of the mother-
firm could be determinant in providing 
incentives for applying for public subsidies; 
AGE: this is a dummy variable assuming 
value one whether the firm was set up between 
1998 and 2000 (and zero otherwise). Experience 
can be an important feature for attracting 
subsidy opportunities; 
GROUP: this is a dummy variable tacking 
value one if the firm belongs to a group of firms 
and one otherwise. A firm belonging to a group 
can be more able than others in receiving 
information on possible financing opportunities. 
                                                                    
33 For example, deciding which share of total R&D 
expenditures have to be capitalized is a choice of the 
firm management.  
Finally, three dummy variables have been 
introduced to control for firm geographical 
position (GEO), sectoral specialization 
(SECTOR) and dimension (SIZE)34: 
GEO: this is the geographic stratification 
variable splitting the sample into 10 Italian 
macro regions; 
SECTOR: this is the sectoral stratification 
variable according to the two-digit Nace Rev. 1 
classification; 
SIZE: this is the dimensional stratification 
variable splitting the sample into four 
dimensional groups: small (10-19 employees), 
medium-small (20-49), medium-large (50-249) 
and large (250 and more). 
Table 3 displays a test on mean difference for 
the exogenous variables. The average size of 
non-supported firms is similar to that of the 
funded ones (around 250 employees) and the 
difference is not significant; the average 
percentage of skilled employees is again similar 
between the two groups and around 11%; export 
intensity, on the contrary, is different in the two 
groups: 21% in the financially supported and 
about 14% in the non-treated units; capital 
intensity is not significantly different, while the 
cash flow intensity (per employee) between the 
two groups is significantly different: according 
to our predictions non-supported firms present a 
larger cash flow intensity, about 6 thousand 
Euros per employee against 4 thousand Euros of 
the others; the debt intensity (on total liabilities) 
is significantly different, but the distance 
between the two groups is not too strong; the 
immaterial assets (knowledge) identifies a 
significant difference between the two groups of 
firms with supported firms showing a greater 
level of knowledge accumulation; finally AGE, 
FOREIGN and GROUP35 identify all significant 
differences with supported firms generally older, 
owned by a foreign company and non belonging 
to a group.  
                                                                    
34 According to the Italian CIS3, those are the 
stratification variables adopted in sampling firms (see 
“Nota metodologica” in ISTAT, 2004, p. 45-46). 
35 The variable group is not shown in table 1 since it 
gives problem to satisfy the “balancing property”; 
nevertheless, we found that the difference of this 
variable in the two groups is significant, with non-
supported firms, on average, more characterized by 
belonging to a group of firms.  
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TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics for the exogenous variables 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Pr(|T| > |t|) 
EMP 98 
0 3405 264 60.8253  
1 2369 254 38.14663  
Overall 5774 260 39.13261  
Difference  10 79.56307 0.9016 
EMPSKILL 00 
0 2391 0.115 0.003  
1 1754 0.110 0.004  
Overall 4145 0.113 0.003  
Difference  0.005 0.005 0.3008 
EXPINT 98 
0 3405 0.139 0.004  
1 2369 0.215 0.006  
Overall 5774 0.170 0.003  
Difference  -0.076 0.007 0.000 
CAPINT 98 
0 2427 63.13 13.22  
1 1959 49.61 3.57  
Overall 4386 57.09 7.49  
Difference  13.52 15.06 0.370 
CASHINT 98 
0 2427 5.66 0.857  
1 1959 3.72 0.343  
Overall 4386 4.79 0.499  
Difference  1.94 1.003 0.0535 
DEBTINT 98 
0 2427 0.653 0.004  
1 1959 0.642 0.004  
Overall 4386 0.648 0.003  
Difference  0.011 0.006 0.0689 
KNOWLEDGE 98 
0 1867 1.89E+08 2.07E+07  
1 1541 1.48E+09 8.11E+08  
Overall 3408 7.71E+08 3.67E+08  
Difference  -1.29E+09 7.37E+08 0.0809 
AGE 
0 3405 0.038 0.003  
1 2369 0.026 0.003  
Overall 5774 0.033 0.002  
Difference  0.012 0.005 0.0105 
FOREIGN 
0 3405 0.884 0.005  
1 2369 0.936 0.005  
Overall 5774 0.905 0.004  
Difference  -0.052 0.008 0.000 
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As to the target variables (the endogenous 
variables of our application), table 4 puts on 
evidence some interesting aspects. R&D 
expenditures in 2000 presents a strong 
difference between supported (969 thousands 
Euros) and non-supported firms (129 thousand 
Euros); also the R&D intensity reveals a strong 
diversity between the two groups with a value of 
0.6% for non-supported and a value of 2% for 
supported units; the R&D per employees is 
again very diverse in the two groups with treated 
units performing about 2.7 thousand Euros of 
R&D per employees and non-supported firms 
about 0.8 thousand Euros; innovative turnover is 
also significant, but the difference is not so 
strong; nevertheless, a cautious approach is 
preferable since this last variable represents a 
final output rather than an additional R&D 
effort. 
In sum, the group of supported firms is a 
selective one: it is characterised by a greater 
knowledge capital stock, while not by greater 
size or a larger capital intensity (differently, for 
instance, from the Sweden CIS-based analysis); 
moreover funded units have a stronger 
propensity to export, a relatively older age and 
the fact of being, on average, part of a foreign 
group (but not part of a group in general); in 
terms of external financial sources (equity and 
debts) the two group’s distance is not too strong 
(again differently from the Sweden case), 
differently from what we find for the cash-flow 
intensity (strong divergence). 
If we report all the sample values to the 
industry population we will find out that our CIS 
sample overestimate the variables means, since 
it excludes firms from 1 to 9 employees and the 
sample stratification is probably unbalanced 
towards larger firms. Using sample weights we 
could correct for this overestimation.  
 
 
TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics for the endogenous variables 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Pr(|T| > |t|) 
R&D expenditure 00 
0 3405 129.1 14.97  
1 2369 969.6 214.05  
Overall 5774 473.9 88.42  
Difference  -840.5 179.4316 0.000 
R&D intensity 00 
0 3405 0.006 0.001  
1 2369 0.020 0.001  
Overall 5774 0.012 0.001  
Difference  -0.014 0.001 0.000 
R&D per employee 00 
0 3405 0.848 0.056  
1 2369 2.715 0.144  
combined 5774 1.614 0.069  
diff  -1.868 0.138 0.000 
Innovative turnover 00 
0 3405 0.265 0.005  
1 2369 0.295 0.006  
Overall 5774 0.277 0.004  
Difference  -0.030 0.008 0.0002 
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TABLE 5. Probit regression of treatment on exogenous variables to identify propensity scores.  
Sectoral, geographical and dimensional dummies included  
 TREATMENT Coefficient Std. Err. ey/ex Std. Err. P > | z | 
 EMP 98  9.28e-08 8.94e-06 0.00001 0.0015 0.992 
 EMPSKILL 00 *** 0.82 0.082 0.072 0.0072 0.000 
 EXPINT 98 *** 0.22 0.045 0.043 0.0089 0.000 
 CAPINT 98 *** -0.00009 0.00003 -0.006 0.0019 0.002 
 CASHINT 98 * -0.001 0.00056 -0.0044 0.0023 0.057 
 DEBTINT 98  0.0003 0.05889 0.0002 0.0353 0.995 
 KNOWLEDGE 98 *** 1.10e-10 1.99e-11 0.027 0.0049 0.000 
 FOREIGN  0.60 0.045 - - 0.000 
 AGE  -1.035 0.1108 - - 0.000 
 CONS  -6.5078 0.7242 - - 0.000 
 SECTOR ***     0.000 
 GEO ***     0.000 
 SIZE ***     0.000 
 Number of obs 2574     
 LR chi2 2472.43     
 Prob > chi2 0.000     
 Pseudo R2 0.118     
 Log likelihood -9211.25     
 
Note: * = significant at 10%; ** = significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%. The regression takes into account sam-
pling weights. 
 
TABLE 6. Descriptive statistics for the estimated propensity scores 
Basic moments Percentiles Range of variation 
# of obs. 5100 1% 0.045 Smallest Largest 
Mean 0.444 5% 0.112 0.035 1 
Std. Dev. 0.199 10% 0.170 0.036 1 
Variance 0.040 25% 0.291 0.038 1 
Skewness 0.008 50% 0.451 0.038 1 
Kurtosis 2.366 75% 0.590    
   90% 0.703    
   95% 0.762    
    99% 0.884     
 
 
TABLE 7. Optimal number of blocks with treated and control units according to the algorithm test-
ing for the balancing property of the estimated propensity scores 
Blocks Controls Treated Total 
0 0 3 3 
1 187 39 226 
2 398 233 631 
4 488 475 963 
5 229 404 633 
6 17 67 84 
Total 1319 1221 2540 
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5. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
The specification of our probit regression 
used to estimate the propensity scores is based 
on the previous set of covariates finding a large 
agreement in the R&D financing literature36. 
The probit is used for identifying the propensity 
scores: this is an instrumental passage, which 
give anyway rich information.  
The probit equation is estimated by using 
sampling weights, so that we obtain parameters 
valid for the entire population. The number of 
sample observations drop to 2,574 (compared to 
the available 5,672 units because of the great 
number of missing values in balance sheet 
variables). The regression fits quite well since 
the Chi-square test is highly significant for the 
overall regression and the pseudo R-square is 
about 12%; in the probit specification the 
variable “group” has been ruled out, since it 
didn’t satisfy the “balancing property”, while all 
other variables are included.  
Following table 5 covariate by covariate, we 
briefly comment the “elasticity value” (ey/ex), 
calculated holding all variables equal to their 
sample mean: EMP is not significant, with an 
elasticity around zero; EMPSKILL is highly 
significant with a positive sign and an elasticity 
around 7% : it means that if the EMPSKILL 
number double then the probability to become 
treated increase of about 7%; EXPINT is highly 
significant, positive and with an elasticity of 
about 4%; CAPINT is significant with a negative 
and low elasticity; CASHINT is negative 
according to our prediction and significant too; 
DEBTINT is not significantly different from 
zero; KNOWLEDGE is significant and positive 
with an elasticity of about 3%: if the knowledge 
capital stock doubles, the probability of 
becoming supported increases of 3%; FOREIGN 
is significant with a positive sign; AGE is 
significant with a negative sign; finally, the CIS 
stratification variables, SECTOR, GEO and 
SIZE are all highly significant. 
In sum the probability of receiving a public 
fund37 goes with a high knowledge capital stock 
                                                                    
36 See, for example: Bérubé and Mohnen (2007), 
Busom (2000), and the work of Aerts and Czarnitzki 
(2004). 
37 The probit applied to CIS data shows the 
and better human capital, while it is accompa-
nied by a low capital intensity (although with a 
minor elasticity), being part of a foreign group 
(differently, for example, from the Sweden case) 
and with a lower internal source of funding 
(cash flow); the degree of indebtedness is not 
relevant: as such, it can be considered both a 
positive sign of access to external sources or a 
negative sign of dependence from an external 
one.  
Table 6 illustrates the main characteristics of 
the estimated propensity scores. As expected the 
mean is around 0.5, the skewness is very low 
while the kurtosis is quite high (fat tails). The 
distribution looks anyway very close to a Nor-
mal one.  
Table 7 shows the optimal number of blocks, 
according to the algorithm testing for the 
“balancing property” of the estimated propensity 
scores; in each block the number of controls is 
always greater of treated groups; the selected 
number of treated is 1,221 firms and the 
“selected” total number of controls is 1,319: 
total observations are 2,540.  
 
Tables from 8 to 13 (in appendix B) show the 
test of the balancing property for our probit 
specification; in each table, i.e., in each block, 
the difference of the mean between the 
propensity scores and all the other variables is 
tested. We accept differences until a 10% of 
statistical significance: according to this 
assumption, it can be easily seen that each 
variable, including the propensity scores, is 
balanced in each block. 
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of 
the propensity scores distribution of treated and 
untreated firms before and after the “one-to-one 
nearest neighbour” matching; we show this 
figure just to put into evidence the improvement 
of the balance between treated and controls we 
get after doing matching (even though it should 
be possible to form this figure for all matching 
methods we use). 
                                                                                                 
probability of receiving a subsidy, rather than the 
probability of choosing to enter or not in a R/D 
programmes, since we do not know if firms without 
subsidies have presented a demand, which has not been 
accepted by the public agency, or if they have not 
presented any demand at all.  
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TABLE 14. Estimation of the Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) according to seven dif-
ferent Matching procedures, OLS (weighted and unweighted) and the Heckman selection model  
Evaluation Pro-
cedure Endogenous variable  
Number 
of  
treated 
Number 
of 
control 
ATET 
(Sample) 
ATET  
(Population) S.E. Δ (or ρ) T-value 
Matching 
1. Stratification 
R&D intensity *** 
R&D expenditure *** 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. turnover ** 
1218 
1218 
1218 
1218 
3879 
3879 
3879 
3879 
0.016 
1245.3 
2.172 
0.027 
0.012 
340.9 
1.514 
0.024 
0.002 
392.7 
0.302 
0.013 
- 
- 
- 
- 
6.69 
3.16 
7.20 
2.11 
2. One-to-one 
Nearest  Nei-
ghbour 
R&D intensity *** 
R&D expenditure ** 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. Turnover 
1207 
1207 
1207 
1207 
650 
650 
650 
650 
0.015 
1038.9 
1.941 
0.010 
0.011 
284.4 
1.353 
0.009 
0.002 
382.2 
0.034 
0.015 
2.55 
5.49 
2.29 
1.03 
5.65 
2.72 
5.66 
0.64 
3. Three-Nearest 
Neighbour 
R&D intensity *** 
R&D expenditure ** 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. turnover ** 
1207 
1207 
1207 
1207 
1053 
1053 
1053 
1053 
0.016 
1001.7 
2.066 
0.028 
0.012 
274.2 
1.440 
0.025 
0.002 
381.1 
0.290 
0.013 
2.88 
4.73 
2.50 
1.10 
6.97 
2.63 
7.10 
2.02 
4. Kernel 
R&D intensity *** 
R&D expenditure *** 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. turnover * 
1123 
1123 
1123 
1123 
1281 
1281 
1281 
1281 
0.013 
340.3 
1.825 
0.026 
0.010 
93.16 
1.272 
0.023 
0.001 
55.55 
0.262 
0.012 
2.71 
2.98 
2.46 
1.09 
6.76 
6.12 
6.95 
2.00 
5. Radius 
(r = 0.001) 
R&D intensity *** 
R&D expenditure ** 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. turnover * 
1113 
1113 
1113 
1113 
1133 
1133 
1133 
1133 
0.013 
693.4 
1.932 
0.026 
0.010 
189.8 
1.347 
0.023 
0.002 
302.8 
0.283 
0.013 
2.62 
3.91 
2.56 
1.09 
6.49 
2.29 
6.81 
1.88 
6. Radius 
(r = 0.0001) 
R&D intensity *** 
R&D expenditure 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. Turnover 
336 
336 
336 
336 
337 
337 
337 
337 
0.010 
1351.7 
1.514 
0.032 
0.008 
370.0 
1.055 
0.028 
0.002 
981.4 
0.474 
0.023 
2.42 
6.17 
2.17 
1.12 
3.85 
1.38 
3.19 
1.35 
7. Radius 
(r = 0.00001) 
R&D intensity * 
R&D expenditure 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. Turnover 
36 
36 
36 
36 
38 
38 
38 
38 
0.014 
525.2 
2.097 
0.020 
0.011 
143.8 
1.462 
0.018 
0.007 
442.6 
0.814 
0.073 
2.85 
4.43 
2.93 
1.11 
1.78 
1.19 
2.58 
0.28 
OLS 
8. OLS Regres-
sion 
(unweighted) 
R&D intensity *** 
R&D expenditure *** 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. Turnover 
1308 
1308 
1308 
1308 
1319 
1319 
1319 
1319 
0.014 
1127.6 
1.897 
0.020 
0.011 
308.7 
1.322 
0.018 
0.0017 
397.8 
0.231 
0.0116 
- 
- 
- 
- 
8.00 
2.83 
8.19 
9. OLS Regres-
sion 
(weighted) 
R&D intensity *** 
R&D expenditure *** 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. turnover *** 
1308 
1308 
1308 
1308 
1319 
1319 
1319 
1319 
0.010 
538.7 
1.29 
0.014 
0.010 
538.7 
1.29 
0.014 
0.0005 
108.2 
0.064 
0.005 
- 
- 
- 
- 
18.18 
4.98 
20.01 
2.87 
Selection model 
10.Heckman (ML) 
R&D intensity 
R&D expenditure *** 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. turnover *** 
1308 
1308 
1308 
1308 
1319 
1319 
1319 
1319 
0.014 
2618.1 
2.338 
0.36 
0.011 
716.7 
1.630 
0.316 
0.010 
755.1 
0.658 
0.038 
ρ = 0.002 
ρ = -0.1* 
ρ = -
0.05* 
ρ =-
0.66*** 
1.30 
3.47 
3.55 
9.40 
Average on Matching 
Average 
 (over 1-7) 
R&D intensity *** 
R&D expenditure *** 
R&D per employee *** 
Inn. Turnover 
891 
891 
891 
891 
1196 
1196 
1196 
1196 
0.014 
885.1 
1.935 
0.024 
0.011 
242.3 
1.349 
0.021 
0.002 
419.7 
0.351 
0.023 
2.67 
4.62 
2.49 
1.09 
5.45 
2.78 
5.64 
1.46 
Note: Δ = Ratio of the value of the endogenous variable calculated on treated to that calculated on control units;  
   ρ = correlation between the outcome and the selection equations;  
   * = significant at 10%,  
   ** = significant at 5%,  
 *** = significant at 1%.  
         The ATET for the population is calculated by a proportional rule 
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FIGURE 1. Graphical representations of the propensity scores distribution of “treated”  
and “untreated” firms before and after the One-to-One Nearest Neighbour matching 
 
 
Table 14 shows the estimation of the Average 
Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) according 
to seven different Matching procedures, 
weighted OLS (using sample weights), un-
weighted OLS and the Heckman selection 
model. We indicate with the symbol Δ the ratio 
of the value of the endogenous variable 
calculated on treated to that calculated on 
control units, and with ρ the correlation between 
the unobservables in the outcome and in the 
selection equations within the Heckman method; 
we also distinguish between the ATET 
calculated within the sample and that calculated 
for the whole population, obtained using a 
simple proportional rule38. 
The number of observations by type of 
matching decreases according to the increase in 
“selectivity” of the methods applied. Matching 7 
(Radius with a calliper of 0.00001) is the most 
selective and the number of treated drops to 36 
units; there is, of course, a trade-off between the 
number of treated (size of sample) and 
precision: if we want a better precision of our 
estimation we have to renounce to a larger 
sample size.  
We comment table 14 limiting our attention 
                                                                    
38 Our population results are obtained by a 
proportional rule based on the Italian industry 
population structure. For the endogenous variable Y 
(such as, for example, the R&D intensity) the ATET in 
the population (ATETP) is obtained according to: YP:YS 
= ATETP:ATETS. Since it is a heuristic rule, population 
values have to be taken purely as an indication.   
to the “sample” results. Within the matching 
methods, the difference in the ATET for the 
R&D expenditure ranges from a minimum of 
340 in the Kernel method to a maximum of 
1,351 thousand of Euros in the Radius number 
6; the greatest value is anyhow reached by the 
Heckman method (2,618 thousand Euros); on 
average on matching methods it gets 885 
thousand Euros with a Δ ratio equal to 4.62: it 
means that if a generic control unit does 1 
thousand Euros of R&D expenditure a matched 
treated does 4.62 thousand Euros.  
The difference in ATET for R&D intensity 
among the seven matching procedures is 
negligible since they give very similar results; 
only for Radius with a calliper of 0.0001 there is 
a little lower value (0.010) compared to the 
matching mean (0.014) where, according to the 
Δ ratio, the R&D intensity level of treated firms 
is 2.67 times that of the control units.  
The ATET on the R&D per employee brings 
to similar results as to the R&D intensity: no 
significant differences can be found among the 
various methods: the average of matching 
methods is around 1.9 with a Δ ratio of 2.49, 
while the Heckman procedure brings to a value 
of 2.33; as expected, finally, the results on 
innovative turnover are not significant.  
OLS regressions are reported only for the 
sake of comparison; nevertheless, results of 
OLS regressions on sample are quite identical to 
those of the average matching methods; Indeed 
the ATET for R&D intensity, for example, is 
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equal to 0.014 as before: it seems that the OLS 
bias due to linearity and lack of similarity in the 
control group is quite negligible in our 
application (a result shared with Aerts and 
Czarnitzki, 2004). 
More surprisingly, also the Heckman 
selection model conveys identical results on 
R&D intensity, while on R&D expenditure both 
OLS regressions and Heckman bring to 
substantial differences when compared with 
matching (for OSL, the ATET is 1,127 and for 
the Heckman method it is 2,618 thousand Euros, 
while for the average matching methods, as saw 
before, it gets 885). For the Heckman selection 
model the ρ is negative and quite low: it means 
that the unobservable factors influencing the 
selection-into-program equation are negatively 
correlated with the unobservable factors 
influencing the firm R&D decision, even though 
this correlation seems very low.  
 
 
TABLE 15. Comparison of the propensity scores’ means between treated and non-treated firms be-
fore and after the One-to-one nearest neighbour matching 
Group Before/after Matching Mean of treated Mean of control Difference S.E. P-value 
Geographical patterns 
Before 0.51 0.4 0.11 0.007 0.000 North 
After 0.51 0.51 0.0000 0.008 0.998 
Before 0.54 0.38 0.15 0.020 0.000 Centre 
After 0.54 0.54 0.0001 0.024 0.994 
Before 0.55 0.39 0.15 0.037 0.000 South 
After 0.55 0.55 -0.0008 0.045 0.986 
Sectoral patterns 
Before 0.65 0.45 0.19 0.026 0.000 H-T 
After 0.62 0.62 0.002 0.03 0.943 
Before 0.62 0.47 0.146 0.015 0.000 M-H-T 
After 0.61 0.61 -0.0001 0.021 0.996 
Before 0.56 0.48 0.086 0.013 0.000 M-L-T 
After 0.55 0.55 0.0009 0.017 0.956 
Before 0.51 0.42 0.089 0.015 0.000 L-T 
After 0.5 0.49 0.002 0.018 0.911 
Before 0.46 0.24 0.22 0.03 0.000 KIS 
After 0.37 0.37 0.001 0.036 0.978 
Before 0.38 0.22 0.16 0.024 0.000 LKIS 
After 0.37 0.36 0.009 0.039 0.806 
Dimensional patterns 
Before 0.50 0.29 0.213 0.034 0.000 Small 
After 0.50 0.50 0.001 0.052 0.974 
Before 0.51 0.35 0.163 0.017 0.000 Madium-Small 
After 0.50 0.50 0.002 0.020 0.913 
Before 0.57 0.42 0.014 0.010 0.000 Medium-Large 
After 0.57 0.57 0.0006 0.013 0.963 
Before 0.61 0.38 0.220 0.020 0.000 Large 
After 0.59 0.59 0.0006 0.026 0.979 
Specific sectoral patterns 
Before 0.59 0.38 0.211 0.033 0.000 Chemicals 
After 0.56 0.55 0.002 0.036 0.934 
Before 0.63 0.48 0.15 0.028 0.000 Mechanics 
After 0.6 0.6 -0.003 0.031 0.909 
Before 0.65 0.26 0.39 0.065 0.000 Auto-vehicles 
After 0.61 0.61 0.001 0.091 0.983 
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TABLE 16. Estimation of the Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATET) according to the Strati-
fication and to the One-to-one Nearest Neighbour Matching for different geographical, sectoral and 
dimensional patterns 
Group Matching  Procedure 
Number 
of 
treated 
Number 
of con-
trol 
ATET 
(sample)
 
ATET 
(Population)
Δ  S.E. T-value
Geographical pattern 
Stratification *** 1059 3650 0.012 0.009 - 0.002 7.59 North 
One-to-one N-N *** 1061 596 0.0118 0.009 3.22 0.0016 7.34 
Stratification ** 229 775 0.018 0.014 - 0.008 2.22 Centre 
One-to-one N-N * 229 116 0.0169 0.013 2.01 0.009 1.72 
Stratification ** 88 460 0.028 0.021 - 0.014 2.08 South 
One-to-one N-N ** 89 46 0.029 0.022 3.90 0.014 1.99 
Sectoral pattern 
Stratification *** 155 177 0.03 0.023 - 0.008 3.92 H-T 
One-to-one N-N *** 157 60 0.031 0.023 2.82 0.007 4.06 
Stratification *** 350 555 0.008 0.006 - 0.001 6.31 M-H-T 
One-to-one N-N *** 350 150 0.009 0.007 2.80 0.001 6.27 
Stratification *** 327 954 0.007 0.005 - 0.001 5.23 M-L-T 
One-to-one N-N *** 328 181 0.0078 0.006 3.33 0.001 5.91 
Stratification ***  264  1021  0.007 0.005  -  0.002 3.24  L-T 
One-to-one N-N *** 264 158 0.006 0.005 2.5 0.002 2.85 
Stratification *** 95 405 0.085 0.064 - 0.02 4.25 KIS 
One-to-one N-N ***  96 53  0.06 0.045 4.15 0.02 2.94 
Stratification  91 983 0.001 0.001 - 0.00 1.16 LKIS 
One-to-one N-N 91 72 0.0003 0.000 1.38 0.001 0.34 
Dimensional pattern 
Stratification 103 598 0.016 0.012 - 0.016 0.94 Small 
One-to-one N-N 103 61 0.005 0.004 1.18 0.014 0.40 
Stratification *** 247 1075 0.025 0.019 - 0.006 4.15 Medium-Small 
One-to-one N-N *** 247 143 0.025 0.019 4.57 0.006 4.00 
Stratification *** 594 1674 0.012 0.009 - 0.003 3.94 Medium-Large 
One-to-one N-N *** 594 295 0.011 0.008 2.48 0.003 3.28 
Stratification *** 268 456 0.014 0.011 - 0.003 5.28 Large 
One-to-one N-N *** 270 116 0.013 0.010 4.25 0.002 5.02 
Three specific sectors 
Stratification ** 93 189 0.019 0.014 - 0.009 2.00 Chemicals 
One-to-one N-N * 95 55 0.016 0.012 3.71 0.009 1.95 
Stratification *** 150 172 0.009 0.007 - 0.002 4.65 Mechanics 
One-to-one N-N *** 150 67 0.007 0.005 1.87 0.002 3.54 
Stratification 28 64 0.004 0.003 - 0.003 1.45 Auto-vehicles 
One-to-one N-N 29 14 0.001 0.001 1.15 0.005 0.26 
 
Note: Δ = Ratio of the value of the endogenous variable calculated on treated to that calculated on control units;  
     * = significant at 10%,  
   ** = significant at5%,  
 *** = significant at 1% 
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We now go on by showing results by 
subgroups of firms, at geographical, sectoral and 
dimensional level. In table 15 we report the test 
controlling, in each sub-group, for the difference 
in the mean propensity scores between treated 
and selected controls; after matching, as we can 
see, the difference in propensity scores is no 
longer significant39.  
 
Table 16 presents results according to each 
different sub-group. We only use the R&D 
intensity as outcome variable and only the 
“stratification” and “one-to-one nearest 
neighbour” as matching method.  
We start with groups that show a total 
crowding-out effect: low knowledge intensive 
services (LKIS), very small firms (10-19 
employees), and the auto-vehicle sector; in 
particular, very small firms can be considered an 
example of asset constrained firms and, since 
they are generally not engaged in formal R&D 
activities, they could have used R&D incentives 
as substitutes for other type of investments. The 
crowding-out of the auto-vehicle sector 
behaviour could reflect the Fiat Group crisis in 
the early 2000s, derived by a previous reduction 
on R&D investments.  
Now, we look at groups showing no 
crowding-out effect, sorting them by decreasing 
statistical significance. We found that South-
Italy, Centre-Italy and Chemicals are significant 
but only at 10/5% depending on the methods; all 
the other groups present a value of the ATET 
significant at 1%; South-Italy shows the greatest 
level of Δ ratio (3.90) among the geographical 
groups, even if with a lower significance, given 
the lower number of observations (only 88 
matched treated units). 
Looking at the Δ ratio, among the more 
significant groups, the Medium-Small seized 
firms (20-49 employees) have the greatest value 
of 4.57; in the second position we find Large 
firms (>250 employees) with a value of 4.25 
and, in the third position, the knowledge 
intensive sector (KIS40) with a value of 4.15.  
As to sectors, the most significant Δ ratio, 
                                                                    
39 Also for these groups we test, as before, the 
balancing property; only in few cases we have had to 
change our specification in order to satisfy this property. 
40 See Appendix C for the groups’ definition. 
after KIS, is got by Medium-Low-Tech firms 
with a Δ ratio of 3,33 followed by the High-
Tech and Medium-High-Tech sectors with a 
same Δ ratio of around 2.8; finally, Medium-
Large firms (50-249 employees) perform a 
lower value of 2.48. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The weight of the public funding of private 
R&D investment is still high in EU, 
notwithstanding the EU Commission recurrent 
requests for member States reduction of the 
State aid. We examined the effect of R&D 
subsidies and R&D fiscal measure41 in Italy on 
the manufacturing and services R&D 
expenditure in the period 1998-2000. CIS policy 
instrument mix includes also Regional and 
European R&D incentives, where the first ones, 
even if concerning a high percentage of firms in 
the sample (40%), are usually less consistent in 
size, and the second has a less diffused number 
of beneficiaries; therefore, we can assume that 
what we find out is mainly the effect of the 
national incentive system42.  
We decided not to go for disentangling the 
incentive by the three governance level (the only 
observable data) since in any way each level 
remained a combination of incentives (see also 
paragraph 1). Factors influencing the probability 
of firm participation change by instrument; think 
simply to size: the incentive which was 
introduced the first in Italy (for bottom-up 
projects of Applied research) registers still a 
concentration of large firms as beneficiaries 
(around 64% in 2002), while R&D automatic 
fiscal measures (included in the CIS data) are 
devoted to small firms. So, our analysis (and the 
same for scholars using CIS) does not give a 
clear indication to a policy maker, but a sort of 
pooled evaluation of the average resulting 
factors influencing the probability of 
participation (i.e., the net effect of the private 
                                                                    
41 An automatic measure only for SMEs. 
42 1998-2000 has been a period of change in the 
national R/D incentive system, bringing to a 
rationalization, whose aspects have became more clear 
later (since 2001) with the Decree of application of the 
reform; therefore, our analysis refers mainly to the pre-
existing national incentive system. 
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agent decision and the public agent selection) 
and the conditioned impact on private R&D 
effort.  
The question of the input additionality effect 
implies the capacity of public incentives to 
modify firm R&D investment behaviour by 
adding projects that otherwise should not have 
been undertaken: more risky projects, which 
should have found extra-firm financing with 
more difficulty; larger scope or also larger scale 
R&D project (relevant when a policy aim is to 
reinforce SMEs participation to R&D). As we 
said at the beginning of the paper, given our 
dataset characteristics, we can only control for 
the presence of a total crowding-out, occurring 
when subsidized firms fully substitute public 
funds to internal funding due to opportunistic 
behaviour, to internal fund and/or asset 
constraints or to the lack of efficiency in the 
incentive process implementation. 
The full crowding-out effect concerns a pool 
of instruments, as we said at the beginning, and 
therefore it could be more rare to be found out, 
even though we compensate this “aggregated 
effect” by looking at different subgroups of 
beneficiaries. 
The “total crowding-out” phenomenon 
(which represents a full failure for an incentive 
policy) is not so irrelevant, when looking 
beyond the average results. For example, in the 
above examined study for Sweden, authors 
found out that a total crowding-out effect cannot 
be excluded for firms with more than 50 
employees; Busom (2000) found out that for 
30% of the subsidized firms a total crowding-
out cannot be excluded.  
In Italy at the end of ‘80s the concentration of 
national R&D public funds on a small number 
of products brought out limited multiplicative 
effect, all subsidized firms considered 
(Antonelli, 1989). Since then some changes 
have been introduced in the national R&D 
incentive regulation in Europe, such as the 
necessary justification for demand of subsidy 
higher than an established threshold and for 
large firms (additionality condition), even if the 
cumulativeness of demands and subsidized 
projects for the same firm is not excluded. The 
“incentive” character of the project has to be 
demonstrated ex ante. Italian government has 
recently followed this regulatory address (D.M. 
593/2000) and one of the eligibility condition 
concerns the “incentive” character of the grant 
demanded by large firms (>250 employees) and 
over a threshold.  
From our analysis it results that what 
discriminates to be a subsidized firms (on 
average, for a pool of instruments) is not the 
size, but the human capital skills (capacity and 
project feasibility), the knowledge capital 
accumulation (R&D experience), together with a 
low internal cash flow (internal liquidity 
constraints). Indebtedness is not a discriminating 
variable (for instance, small firms can have 
problems in collecting funds from external 
sources). The positive role of foreign capital 
ownership is also an interesting and different 
from other studies result. It is the confirmation 
of the application of existing measures: in fact, 
our national R&D incentive regulation includes 
among the potential beneficiary foreign owned 
firms localised under the condition of not 
overcoming a threshold of subsidy (less than 
20% of the project cost)43.  
As to the impact of the R&D incentives, our 
analysis excludes a total crowding-out on 
average, when we look at the outcome of the 
aggregated group of subsidized firms. This is a 
statistically very robust result, since it is 
confirmed by all the different econometric tests 
applied, including a control for unobservable 
variables effect (by a selection model à la 
Heckman). In particular: in our sample, on 
average on matching methods, we get 885 
additional thousand Euros of R&D expenditure 
with a Δ ratio equal to 4.62: it means that if a 
generic control unit does 1 thousand Euros of 
R&D expenditure a matched treated does 4,62 
thousand Euros; in the population this value 
drops to 242 thousand Euros. The additionality 
for the R&D intensity is, according to an 
average on various methods, about 0.014 in the 
sample with a Δ ratio of about 2.67, while in the 
population the ATET value drops to 0.010. 
                                                                    
43 Non European owned firms can benefit of national 
R/D incentives if it is demonstrated the difficulty of 
finding a peculiar competence within the European area. 
When foreign owned firms participate for more than 
10% to a R/D project they are allowed to benefit of a 
10% further financial support. Of course if a firm is part 
of a MNC, even if it has a low number of employees, it 
is taken as a large firm and it has to fulfil the same 
conditions. 
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When looking at more disaggregated sub-
samples of subsidized firms, at dimensional, 
sectoral and geographical level, some cases of 
total crowding-out appear for low knowledge 
intensive service sectors, very small firms (10-
19 employees) and the auto-vehicle industry in 
the considered period.  
Moreover it is possible to get a rank of the 
positive effects (according to the Δ ratio), even 
if it has to be borne in mind that this ratio can 
include different amount of public financial 
contributions and that probably relative smaller 
public contributions can produce a lower impact 
on private R&D effort. In our case the highest 
incentive impact is found for medium-small (20-
49 employees) and large firms, followed by 
firms in knowledge intensive services, and those 
located in the South; this latter group is then 
followed by the medium low tech firms and 
those located in the North.  
Even though we do not know how much 
private fund is added to the level of the received 
subsidy, neither what kind of subsidy or subsidy 
mix has been more successful, we take as a first 
positive result finding out that “participation” to 
subsidy programs allow firms to be less 
conditioned by hampering factors, such as low 
size or low technology. Typically less R&D 
intensive groups of firms, such as medium-small 
firms, medium low-tech44 and also firms located 
in the South, have invested more in R&D, 
compared with their non subsidized controls. It 
sounds like a relatively positive message to 
policy makers, inviting them to sustain R&D of 
this kind of firms and their “better R&D 
projects”. Moreover, at a first look, it seems that 
the inclusion of the “additionality” requirement 
for large firms and higher R&D subsidy demand 
in the national regulation has produced good 
results.  
The main limit of this type of analysis is the 
fact that the measure of the differential effect, 
summarized in our work by the Δ ratio, includes 
the subsidy received, without getting any 
information on the degree of this impact. Other 
limits of this type of analysis, with contrasting 
(mainly augmenting) effects on our resulting 
                                                                    
44 Low tech sectors in Italy invest less in R/D than 
the same industry in other European country such as 
Germany; these fact seems also linked to the smaller 
size of our firms. See: Pensa, Rodà and Segni (2008).  
measure of additionality, are the following: 
− Matching methods underestimates the addi-
tionality in presence of spillover effects gene-
rated by subsidies (see Klette, Moen and Gri-
liches, 2000); indeed, we cannot exclude spil-
lover effects on treated units also in our work; 
therefore, the results should be taken as “lo-
wer bounds”. 
− The CIS R&D expenditures data we refer to 
is not the whole R&D value, since some 
components included in the national R&D 
statistics (following the Frascati Manual) are 
not included in this survey (R&D not directly 
devoted to innovation projects); indeed, we 
do not know the effect on the whole R&D 
investment.  
− The values of our estimated ATETs are gene-
rally high: it is so also because our non trea-
ted units are chosen as not receiving any sup-
port for three consecutive years. 
− We were not able to include non-innovating 
firms, and therefore we do not know if a fi-
nancial incentive can produce new starting 
R&D activities. 
 
More informed analysis at micro level are 
asked for controlling for these first results and 
we plan to go further by using data for a 
longitudinal analysis (panel data) looking also at 
the dynamic structure of subsidy effects; we 
plan also to analyse the effect of specific 
national incentive program at firm level. 
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APPENDIX A – METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Before getting into formulas, it seems of worth to better clarify what kind of statistical problem we 
face in our setting. As we said, we are interested in estimating the average treatment effect on 
treated (ATET) defined as: 
 
ATET = E(y1 - y0 | w=1) = E(y1 | w=1) – E( y0 | w=1). 
 
As it is clear, whereas we can observe the quantity E(y1 | w=1) since it is equal to the outcome of 
treated units when they were treated, we “do not observe” the quantity E(y0 | w=1). From 
observation, in fact, we only know the variable E(y0 | w=0), i.e., the (average) level of the outcome 
for non treated units. Knowing what would have been the outcome for treated units if they had not 
been treated is impossible, since we can see only one of the two participation status for each single 
unit. This falls into the general statistical setting of a “missing observation”.  
As we said, the idea behind the matching procedure is to estimate E(y0 | w=1) using non treated 
units that are “similar” to treated units; more precisely we hold: 
 
[A1]    E( y0 | w=1, X=x) = E( y0 | w=0, X=x), 
 
where E( y0 | w=0, X=x) is observable. Relation [A1] is valid only under conditional 
independence assumption (Rubin, 1977): conditional on some pre-treatment observables (the 
variables X), we assume y and w to be independent45. In this case, the conditional (on covariates) 
ATET estimate becomes: 
  
[A2]   ATET (x) = E( y1| w=1, X=x) - E( y0 | w=0, X=x). 
 
 
 
MATCHING 
 
Equation [A2] allows for identifying “cells” within which y and w are independent. To clarify this 
point, suppose that X is formed by two dichotomous variables A and B taking modalities a1, a2 and 
b1, b2 respectively. In this case four cells can be built. According to the conditional independence 
assumption, within each of these cells the experimental setting is restored and the “difference-in-
mean estimator” consistently estimate the ATET(x). To obtain the ATET overall estimation we have 
only to integrate on X (obtaining its marginal distribution). It means that we have to take the mean of 
the various ATET(x) calculated in each cell weighted by the distribution of X conditional on w=1. If 
X is a discrete random variable: 
 
 
x
ATET = ATET(x) Pr(X = x | w= 1)⋅∑
 
When X is highly dimensional or is a continuous variable, an exact matching is not possible. In 
general too many cells have to be built, running the risk of obtaining a large number of cells with 
zero observations. To avoid this drawback (the dimensionality problem), Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) proposed to match individuals according to a single variable: the propensity score. As said 
above, it is obtained from a probit regression with regressors equal to the variables contained in X. 
Each treated and untreated unit has its own propensity score, and units with close propensity score 
are matched. In practise, the authors propose a procedure to form strata according to the propensity 
                                                                    
45 “Conditional-independence-assumption” is another name to call the already cited “ignorability of treatment”. In 
any case, to obtain consistent matching estimate, we only needs “conditional-mean-independence” that is a less 
restrictive hypothesis (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 607).  
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score in which is tested the so called “balancing property”: in each stratum and for each variable 
(included the propensity score) the mean on treated and not treated has to be equal. This procedure 
generates the optimal number of strata as soon as the balancing property is satisfied in each stratum. 
Once obtained this partitioning we can averaging on the “difference-in-mean estimator” on strata 
obtaining a consistent estimation of the ATET46; this procedure is called the “Stratification 
matching”.  
Even if we make use of matching procedures other than the Stratification matching, the balancing 
property has always to be satisfied. Therefore, we have first to test this property on our data (in order 
to ascertain that our probit specification for the calculus of propensity scores is correct) and then 
applying each matching procedure.  
Different matching methods require different formulas for the calculus of the ATET; in our work 
we compare the following seven matching procedures: 1. stratification, 2. one-to-one nearest 
neighbour, 3. three-nearest neighbours, 4. kernel, 5. radius (with a calliper of 0.001), 6. radius (with 
a calliper of 0.0001), 7. radius (with a calliper of 0.00001).  
We have already qualitatively explained in which way the stratification matching works; the 
corresponding formula for the estimated ATET is: 
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where: I(b) is set of units present in block b, TbN is the number of treated units in block b, 
C
bN  is the 
number of control units in block b.  
Other matching methods deserve some further explanation. In the case of the one-to-one nearest 
neighbour each treated is matched with only one control (always in the common support), whose 
propensity score is the closest to that of the treated one according to some specific metric (for exam-
ple, the Mahalanobis metric). In this case the set of control units is defined as: 
{ }( )     |  min  i jjC i j p p= −  
that, for each unit i is a singleton unit j (or three units in the case of the three-nearest neighbours). 
Instead, the set of control units in the case of the “radius” matching is: 
 
{ }( )     |  <  i jC i j p p r= −  
 
representing all the non-treated units falling (always in terms of their propensity score) in the radius 
of dimension r. A general formula for all these matching methods is the following: 
[A3]     
( )
1M T C
i ij jT
i T j C i
ATET y y
N
ω
∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  
where 0 1ijω< <  is the weight given to the control unit j-th in the comparison with the unit i-th 
                                                                    
46 See, Becker and Ichino (2002) for a software implementation. 
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(with:
( )
1ij
j C i
ω
∈
=∑ ). For each treated unit i, the sum in the square brackets is thus a weighted aver-
age of its (selected) control units. In the case of the “arithmetic mean”, the weights become 
1/ Cij iNω = and the previous formula reduces to: 
( )
1 1ArM T C
i jT C
i T j C ii
ATET y y
N N∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ . 
 
Therefore, for the nearest neighbour matching, since CiN =1 (so that j=i), the formula becomes: 
1NN T C
i iT
i i
ATET y y
N
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ , 
 
while for the three-nearest neighbours, it takes the following form: 
 
( )
1 1
3
3NN T C
i jT
i T j C i
ATET y y
N ∈ ∈
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ . 
 
Furthermore, the kernel matching comes up from equation [A3] when: 
 
1
( )
( )
C
i
j i
ij N
j i
j
K p p
K p p
ω
=
−=
−∑
, 
 
where K is the kernel function.  
 
Finally, provided that outcomes are considered independent across units, it can be proved that the 
analytical variance of the estimator in equation [A3] is equal to: 
 
( ) 221 ( ) ( ) ( )( )M T Ci j jT j T j CVar ATET Var y Var yN ω∈ ∈= +∑ ∑  
 
where j ijiω ω=∑ . It is quite clear that there is a penalty for using the same controls more than 
one time. 
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The selection model 
 
As we saw in section 3, the selection model is composed of two (correlated) equations: one for the 
outcome and one for the selection equation, and takes the following form: 
[A4]      
*
*
*
1     0
0     0
( ; ) 0
i i i i
i i i
i
i
i
i i
y x w u
w z v
if w
w
if w
Cov u v
μ γ α
η β
ρ
= + + +⎧⎪ = + +⎪⎪ ⎧ ≥⎨ ⎪= ⎨⎪ <⎪⎩⎪⎪ = ≠⎩
 
 
where x and z are covariates and u and v are unobservable components (error terms) with zero 
unconditional mean, but supposed to be correlated. Under this assumptions ( ) 0i iE w u⋅ ≠  so that 
the OLS estimate of the outcome equation is inconsistent. We could rewrite the first equation of 
[A4] in the two different regimes: 
1:    
0 :    .
i i i i
i i i i
w y x u
w y x u
μ γ α
μ γ
= = + + +
= = + +  
 
It would seem possible to run two OLS regressions on them, obtaining α  as the difference 
between the two (estimated) intercepts. The problem of this procedure, unfortunately, is that under 
both the regimes the error term has not zero unconditional mean; in fact: 
( | ) ( ) 0
( | ) ( ) 0.
i i i i
i i i i
E u v z E u
E u v z E u
η β
η β
≥ − − ≠ =
< − − ≠ =  
 
This is a typical case of “omitted variable specification error”, that can be solved by adding the 
non-zero means into the equations, obtaining:  
[A5]    
1:    [ ( | )]
0 :    [ ( | )]
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
w y x u E u v z
w y x u E u v z
μ γ α η β
μ γ η β
= = + + + − ≥ − −
= = + + − < − −  
 
Now, the errors terms in the squared brackets have zero mean. The problem is that we cannot 
observe ( | )i i iE u v zη β≥ − −  and ( | )i i iE u v zη β< − − . Nevertheless, we can estimate them by 
using the participation equation and the joint normality of u and v. From the joint normality it can be 
proved that: 
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1 1
0 0
( | )
( | )
i i i i
i i i i
E u v z M
E u v z M
η β λ
η β λ
≥ − − = −
< − − = −  
 
 where: 1 ( ) /[1 ( )]i i iM z zφ η β η β= − − −Φ − −  and 0 ( ) /[ ( )]i i iM z zφ η β η β= − − Φ − −  are 
known as Mill’s ratios (with φ  and Φ  being the normal density function and its cumulative 
respectively), while 1 ,u u vλ σ σ= ⋅ and 0 ,u u vλ σ σ= − ⋅ .  
We can estimate equations [A5] by a two-step procedure or via maximum likelihood (Maddala, 
1983). In the two-step we first estimate 1iM  and 0iM  (once obtained a consistent estimation of η 
and β from a probit regression of the participation equation); secondly, with these estimations at 
hand, we can estimate 1λ  and 0λ  by simple OLS (taking standard errors corrected for generated 
regressors); we might then estimate also the coefficient of correlation ρ between u and v (since 
2
1 / uρ λ σ= ). Since, under joint normality of (u, v) this method becomes fully parametric a partial 
maximum likelihood approach can be used to estimate consistently all parameters.  
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APPENDIX B – TESTING THE BALANCING PROPERTY WITHIN BLOCKS 
 
TABLE 8. Test of the “balancing property” for the model adopted. Note: the algorithm used rejects 
equality in the means of the variables just at a level of significance smaller than 1% (see Becker and 
Ichino, 2002) 
Block 1 Group Number Mean Difference P-value 
0 187 0.132 -0.004 0.612 Propensity score 
1 39 0.137 - - 
0 187 171.59 -119.9962 0.203 
EMP 98 
1 39 291.59   
0 187 0.125 -0.033724 0.263 
EMPSKILL 00 
1 39 0.159   
0 187 0.083 -0.0813 0.036 
EXPINT 98 
1 39 0.16   
0 187 152.06 73.37 0.752 
CAPINT 98 
1 39 78.68   
0 187 18.04 7.25 0.620 
CASHINT 98 
1 39 10.79   
0 187 0.66 0.055 0.141 
DEBTINT 98 
1 39 0.6   
0 187 8.65E+07 -1.84E+08 0.015 
KNOWLEDGE 98 
1 39 2.70E+08   
0 187 0.06 -0.043 0.320 
AGE 
1 39 0.10   
0 187 0.598 -0.195 0.020 
FOREIGN 
1 39 0.794   
 
TABLE 9. Test of the “balancing property” for the model adopted. Note: within each block, the algo-
rithm used accepts quality in the means of the variables just at a level of significance less than or 
equal to 1% 
Block 2 Group Number Mean Difference P-value 
0 202 0.251 -0.004 0.309 Propensity score 
1 77 0.255   
0 202 1059 916.6 0.541 EMP 98 
1 77 142.3   
0 202 0.111 -0.016 0.434 EMPSKILL 00 
1 77 0.128   
0 202 0.126 -0.008 0.783 EXPINT 98 
1 77 0.134   
0 202 135.5 4.89 0.975 CAPINT 98 
1 77 130.6   
0 202 5.95 -1.9 0.692 CASHINT 98 
1 77 7.86   
0 202 0.62 0.012 0.644 DEBTINT 98 
1 77 0.61   
0 202 1.35E+08 2.29E+07 0.801 KNOWLEDGE 98 
1 77 1.12E+08   
0 202 0.014 -0.024 0.216 AGE 
1 77 0.038   
0 202 0.702 -0.089 0.135 FOREIGN 
1 77 0.792   
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TABLE 10. Test of the “balancing property” for the model adopted. Note: within each block, the al-
gorithm used accepts equality in the means of the variables just at a level of significance less than or 
equal to 1% 
Block 3 Group Number Mean Difference P-value 
0 196 0.352 0.001 0.862 Propensity score 
1 156 0.351   
0 196 176.3 -56.48 0.143 EMP 98 
1 156 232.8   
0 196 0.118 0.007 0.686 EMPSKILL 00 
1 156 0.111   
0 196 0.168 -0.018 0.533 EXPINT 98 
1 156 0.187   
0 196 66.5 5.68 0.741 CAPINT 98 
1 156 60.8   
0 196 8.14 4.21 0.333 CASHINT 98 
1 156 3.92   
0 196 0.63 0.028 0.191 DEBTINT 98 
1 156 0.6   
0 196 1.56E+08 2.41E+07 0.634 KNOWLEDGE 98 
1 156 1.32E+08   
0 196 0.005 -0.007 0.435 AGE 
1 156 0.012   
0 196 0.78 0.067 0.142 FOREIGN 
1 156 0.71   
 
 
TABLE 11. Test of the “balancing property” for the model adopted. Note: within each block, the al-
gorithm used accepts equality in the means of the variables just at a level of significance less than or 
equal to 1% 
Block 4 Group Number Mean Difference P-value 
0 488 0.500 -0.006 0.076 Propensity score 
1 475 0.506   
0 488 180.1 -40.2 0.209 EMP 98 
1 475 220.3   
0 488 0.076 -0.01 0.224 EMPSKILL 00 
1 475 0.087   
0 488 0.259 -0.015 0.384 EXPINT 98 
1 475 0.275   
0 488 42.2 -4.154 0.233 CAPINT 98 
1 475 46.4   
0 488 5.23 1.01 0.307 CASHINT 98 
1 475 4.21   
0 488 0.61 -0.008 0.513 DEBTINT 98 
1 475 0.62   
0 488 1.34E+08 -7.76E+07 0.029 KNOWLEDGE 98 
1 475 2.11E+08   
0 488 0 -0.004 0.151 AGE 
1 475 0.004   
0 488 0.91 -0.014 0.405 FOREIGN 
1 475 0.92   
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TABLE 12. Test of the “balancing property” for the model adopted. Note: within each block, the al-
gorithm used accepts equality in the means of the variables just at a level of significance less than or 
equal to 1% 
Block 5 Group Number Mean Difference P-value 
0 229 0.675 -0.010 0.021 Propensity score 
1 404 0.685   
0 229 198.5 -78.3 0.214 EMP 98 
1 404 276.9   
0 229 0.09 -0.007 0.567 EMPSKILL 00 
1 404 0.1   
0 229 0.34 -0.036 0.132 EXPINT 98 
1 404 0.38   
0 229 38.6 -0.39 0.936 CAPINT 98 
1 404 39   
0 229 3.65 0.91 0.302 CASHINT 98 
1 404 2.73   
0 229 0.63 -0.007 0.623 DEBTINT 98 
1 404 0.64   
0 229 3.35E+08 -7.47E+06 0.924 KNOWLEDGE 98 
1 404 3.42E+08   
0 229 dropped dropped dropped AGE 
1 404 dropped dropped dropped 
0 229 0.97 -0.002 0.862 FOREIGN 
1 404 0.98   
 
TABLE 13. Test of the “balancing property” for the model adopted. Note: within each block, the al-
gorithm used accepts equality in the means of the variables just at a level of significance less than or 
equal to 1% 
Block 6 Group Number Mean Difference P-value 
0 17 0.841 -0.024 0.103 Propensity score 
1 67 0.865   
0 17 280 -1156.4 0.196 EMP 98 
1 67 1436.4   
0 17 0.26 0.008 0.916 EMPSKILL 00 
1 67 0.25   
0 17 0.3 -0.087 0.293 EXPINT 98 
1 67 0.39   
0 17 53.5 3.52 0.83 CAPINT 98 
1 67 50   
0 17 -25.8 -26.14 0.055 CASHINT 98 
1 67 0.25   
0 17 0.55 -0.081 0.142 DEBTINT 98 
1 67 0.63   
0 17 2.16E+09 -2.30E+09 0.299 KNOWLEDGE 98 
1 67 4.46E+09   
0 17 dropped dropped dropped AGE 
1 67 dropped dropped dropped 
0 17 0.94 -0.028 0.571 FOREIGN 
1 67 0.97   
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APPENDIX C – MACRO-SECTORS’ DEFINITION 
High-technology manufacturing 
 
 
Pharmaceuticals 
Office machinery and computers 
Radio, TV and communication 
equipment 
Instrument engineering 
Manufacture of aircraft and 
spacecraft 
 
Medium-high-technology 
manufacturing 
 
Chemicals 
Chemicals, excluding pharmaceu-
ticals 
Machinery and equipment 
Electrical machinery 
Motor vehicles 
Other transport equipment, ex-
cluding ships and aerospace 
Other transport equipment 
Medium-low-technology 
manufacturing 
 
Coke, refined petroleum prod-
ucts and nuclear fuel 
Rubber and plastic products 
Other non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts 
Basic metals 
Fabricated metal products 
Building and repairing of ships 
and boats 
Low-technology manufacturing 
 
 
Food and beverages 
Tobacco products 
Textiles 
Clothing 
Leather products 
Wood products 
Pulp and paper products 
Publishing and printing 
Manufacturing n.e.c. 
Recycling 
Knowledge-intensive services 
 
 
Water transport 
Air transport 
Post and telecommunications 
Computer and related activities 
Other business activities 
 
Less knowledge-intensive  
services 
 
Motor trade 
Wholesale trade 
Retail trade 
Hotels and restaurants 
Land transport 
Auxiliary transport activities 
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